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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed Rees v. Peyton,' a case that
had been on its docket since 1965.2 Rees was a death penalty case in which
the petitioner sought to withdraw his petition for writ of certiorari so that he
could be executed.3 The Court stayed the proceedings after Rees was found
incompetent to waive his appeal,4 but the Court did not dismiss the case
until after Rees died of natural causes.5 Rees pended in the Court during the
terms of three Chief Justices. Even though the Court underwent major
changes in personnel and philosophy during those years, the Court's
treatment of Rees was essentially the same-to hold the case in abeyance.
This article chronicles the extraordinary history of Rees in the U.S. Supreme
Court for those thirty years.
Rees's case in the Supreme Court began as an ordinary request from a
1. Rees v. Superintendent, 516 U.S. 802 (1995).
2. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
3. Id. at 313.
4. Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
5. Rees, 516 U.S. 802; see Bill McKelway, Slayer of Louisa Family in '59 Dies in
Prison, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 1995, at B 1.
[Vol. 49:885
2004] COMPETENCY TO WAIVE DEATH PENALTY APPEALS 887
death row inmate to review the federal appellate court's affirmance of the
district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging
the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. Within one month,
however, Rees wrote a letter informing his attorney of his "mature &
considered" decision to withdraw the petition for writ of certiorari and
abandon all legal proceedings.6 Rees's attorney notified the Court and
opposing counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia of Rees's position; at
the same time, however, he raised his own concern that Rees was
incompetent to make this decision.
By 1965, it was well established that a defendant in a criminal case had
to be competent both to stand trial and, if sentenced to death, to be
executed. The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial was
"'whether [the person] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him." 7 For competency to be executed, the common law required that the
person understand his impending punishment and the reason for it.8 But
Rees presented the Court with a different issue: what kind of competency
was required to abandon or continue with an appeal pending before the
Court? Rees appears to be the first case in which the Court confronted this
issue.
Despite the fact that Rees became a case of first impression for the
Court once Rees sought to waive his appeal, the official published court
orders reveal little about what happened in this case substantively or
procedurally.9 In a 1966 order, the Court retained jurisdiction and remanded
6. Letter from S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (Aug. 3, 1965) (citing Letter from Melvin Davis Rees, Jr., Petitioner, to S.
White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner (July 18, 1965) (U.S. National Archives). See infra
note 16 explaining document sources.
7. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (citation omitted). In 1966, while the
Court was figuring out how to proceed in Rees, it clarified its ruling in Dusky. In Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966), the Court held that due process required that the trial
court must hold a hearing when evidence raised a "'bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's
competency to stand trial." Id.
8. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,406-10 (1986) (discussing the long standing
religious and societal reasons why the common law prohibited the execution of a person who
was no longer sane; noting that every state prohibited executing the insane).
9. Newspaper inquiries in 1965 suggest that, despite the Court's silence, Rees was a
noteworthy case from the start. See Letter from Alfred Friendly, Managing Editor, THE
WASH. POST, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 1, 1965) (seeking
permission for a reporter to review Rees's letter withdrawing his appeal and Rhyne's letter
to the Court, noting "[plublicity about the [documents] is inevitable") (U.S. National
Archives); Letter from John Goolrick, Reporter, THE FREE LANCE STAR, to John F. Davis,
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 1, 1965) (stamped rec'd Jan. 1966) (asking about present
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the case to the federal district court for an initial determination of whether
Rees was competent to decide to abandon or continue his appeals.' °
Subsequently, in 1967, without explanation, the Court issued an order
staying the case pending further order of the Court." In 1995, the Court
dismissed the case.'
2
Even though the Court's decisions do not tell us how or why the Court
acted as it did, one piece of Rees has endured-the standard the Court
crafted in 1966 for assessing when a person is competent to waive his or her
appeals. 3 To this day, lower courts apply the Rees test to determine whether
an inmate who has been sentenced to death is competent to abandon his or
her appeals. 4 Ironically, the Court itself never applied its own test in Rees.
It articulated the standard in the context of remanding the case to the federal
district court for its assessment of Rees's competency. Upon receipt of the
lower court's report on Rees's competency in 1967, and briefing by the
parties, the Court, without written comment, stayed further proceedings.
The 1967 decision did not reflect the federal district court's conclusion,
made on remand, that Rees was incompetent to abandon or continue the
litigation. One could surmise that, in issuing a stay, the Court accepted the
way in which the district court inquired into Rees's competency and applied
the test. Still, without any stated basis for its decision, the case provided no
guidance for future cases. 5 Why the Court stayed Rees in 1967, and why
that stay remained in effect until 1995, has remained a mystery until now.
Archival research shows that the Court struggled with this case not only
in issuing its initial remand order in 1966 and its stay order in 1967, but also
in reconsidering the status of the case years later in 1971 and 1988.16 At
status of case) (U.S. National Archives).
10. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
11. Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
12. Rees v. Superintendent, 516 U.S. 802 (1995).
13. The test for determining a person's "mental competence in the present posture of
things" is whether he has the "capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice
with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he
is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his
capacity in the premises." Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
14. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
15. But see Epilogue, infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's recent application of the Rees documents).
16. My primary source of information was the public U.S. Supreme Court file housed
at the U.S. National Archives. Throughout the article, these documents will be designated
by a parenthetical citation, U.S. National Archives. I found additional documents when I
read Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s and Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers at the Library
of Congress. Throughout the article, documents from the Justices will be designated by a
parenthetical citation that will indicate the Justices initials (WJB or TM) and the Box and
File number that contain the document. Finally, Rees's appellate attorney, S. White Rhyne,
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each juncture the documents, including correspondence, motions and
responses, and internal Supreme Court memos from the Clerk of the Court,
show the Court considering numerous ways to proceed with the case.
Although the Court revisited the case during the thirty years, once it decided
to stay the proceedings, it never deviated from that decision.
It is worthwhile to study and reflect on the history of Rees for a number
of reasons. First, the documents give a rare glimpse into some of the
internal operations of the Court. This is especially illuminating because it
appears that the Court found the case troubling and was unsure how to
proceed. For example, on several occasions, Chief Justice Warren called on
the Clerk of the Court to consult with the attorneys for Rees and the
Commonwealth of Virginia both as to how the Court might proceed and
whether the parties could reach an informal resolution. Eventually the Court
charted its own course, but only after fairly lengthy consultation with the
parties.
Second, the Court's handling of the case is significant because Rees was
a death penalty case. By the mid-I 960s, executions were steadily declining
and constitutional challenges to the death penalty were mounting in cases
across the country.17 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court decided
several significant constitutional challenges to death penalty statutes. These
culminated in 1972, with Furman v. Georgia,18 in which the Court held the
death penalty unconstitutional.' 9 In the midst of these developments, the
Court first issued (in 1967) and then decided to retain (in 1971) a stay of the
proceedings in Rees. These actions may indicate some of the Justices'
growing concerns about the death penalty; apparently they did not want to
put Rees back into the legal process, where he might face execution, until
the constitutional landscape of the death penalty was resolved. When the
Court revisited Rees a final time in 1988, it still appeared unwilling to
reactivate legal proceedings, but perhaps for different reasons. While the
death penalty was again constitutional,2" the Court was treating cases where
the inmate waived his death penalty appeals far more summarily than it had
in Rees. The Court appears to have thought it better to maintain the status
quo in Rees rather than give the impression that it might now give other
waiver cases more considered scrutiny.
provided me with information and court papers that shed yet new light on the Court
proceedings. These documents will be designated S.W. Rhyne. All documents are on file
with the author.
17. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. Id. at 239-40.
20. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
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Finally, Rees is noteworthy because the Court stayed the proceedings
after the federal district court found Rees incompetent to decide whether to
abandon or continue the litigation.2 Since Rees, and to this day, a judicial
determination that a person is incompetent to waive appeals does not
necessarily mean that a court will stay the litigation. In some instances,
courts allow the case to proceed by appointing a "next friend" to litigate the
case on the person's behalf.22 This allows the case to proceed to its
conclusion, which may include execution. In Rees, it appears that the
Court was reluctant to allow the case to go forward in this manner.
Rees was a difficult case for the Court from beginning to end. For the
first time, a petitioner sought to waive the appeal of his conviction and
death sentence while the case was pending before the Court.2 4 The Court,
therefore, had to establish a procedure by which it would determine whether
a petitioner was competent to waive his appeal. This was an unusual
situation for the Court, one with which it seemed both uncomfortable and
uncertain. Throughout the course of the proceedings, the Court seemed
reluctant to take any action that could be considered precedential.
For thirty years Rees remained on the Court's docket, but no one,
outside of some Court personnel, knew why. Perhaps that is how the Court
wanted it. But now we have the opportunity to learn a fuller version of Rees
v. Peyton, to appreciate the issues the Court had to resolve, and to reflect on
their significance.25 The documents available in Rees shed light on how the
Court handled the case procedurally, but consideration of the broader legal
and historical context helps us understand why the Court acted as it did.
This article traces the legal developments in Rees chronologically,
21. Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
22. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing next friend litigation).
23. See, e.g., In re John Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Tex. 1994). In this case,
federal district court found John Cockrum incompetent to waive his appeals. Id. at 485. The
case proceeded with his attorney acting as next friend and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit denied relief on the merits of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Cockrum
v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 297, 298 (5th Cir. 1997). The State of Texas executed Cockrum in
1997. See DEATH Row U.S.A. REP. 19, NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Winter 2004),
available at http:/www.naacpldf.org (accessed from homepage by selecting Publications and
Death Row U.S.A.) (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
24. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).
25. As E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justices Jackson,
Frankfurter, and Harlan, wrote:
[T]he self-imposed silence of the Justices must not prevent the rest of us from
acquiring as much knowledge as we legitimately can about the most important
court in the land. The Supreme Court should be written about and talked about,
dissected and analyzed, so that when we come to make up our free minds about
it, we act on the basis of fact and not on warped, distorted and biased half-truths.
E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1961).
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interweaving observations about the historical and legal context of the case.
II. PROCEEDINGS IN THE 1960s
In 1961, Melvin Davis Rees, Jr. was convicted of killing three members
of one family. 26 First, he was convicted in federal court of transporting,
kidnapping, and murdering a mother and daughter, Mildred Ann and Susan
Ann Jackson, in Maryland.27 The federal jury did not recommend the death
penalty, so he received two life sentences.2 8 Six months later, he was tried
and convicted in the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County, Virginia of the
first-degree murder of the father, Carroll Vernon Jackson, Jr.29 The Virginia
jury sentenced Rees to death for this crime.30
Rees embarked on the usual course of appeals to challenge the
constitutionality of his state conviction and death sentence.3' He first sought
a writ of error in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. That court denied
the writ, thus affirming his conviction and sentence, and the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Rees's petition for writ of certiorari. 2 Beginning with this
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Rees was represented by S. White
Rhyne, a lawyer from Washington D.C., retained for Rees by his parents.33
Rhyne represented Rees through all of the subsequent litigation related to
26. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849, 860 (D. Md. 1961); Rees v.
Commonwealth, 127 S.E.2d 406 (Va. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 963 (1963).
27. Rees, 193 F. Supp. at 850-51. According to the court, the evidence showed that on
the night of January 11, 1959, Rees forced the Jacksons' car off of the road in Louisa
County, Virginia. Id. at 851. Near Fredericksburg, Virginia, Rees shot Carroll Jackson in the
head and injured his one-year-old daughter Janet, who died of suffocation and exposure. Id.
Rees then drove Mildred and five-year-old Susan to Maryland where he beat both of them
to death. Id. Rees was never prosecuted for the death of Janet Jackson.
28. Id. at 851; Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859, 864 (4th Cir. 1965).
29. Rees, 127 S.E.2d at 407.
30. Id.
31. The trial court judge deferred setting an execution date until all legal challenges,
including post-conviction review in the federal courts, were complete. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit at 3, Rees v. Peyton
(Misc. No. 321) (S.W. Rhyne). This became critical because as long as the case pended in
the U.S. Supreme Court, no execution could take place.
32. Id.
33. S. White Rhyne received his undergraduate degree from Roanoke College in 1952,
his LL.B. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1955, and his LL.M. from
Georgetown University Law Center in 1961 where he was an E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow
in Trial Advocacy. He was admitted to the bar in 1955 and began to practice in the District
of Columbia in 1957. Rhyne went on to have a distinguished career as an attorney
specializing in telecommunications law. He served on the Board of Directors of the Bar
Association of D.C. for many years and on the Executive Committee of the Federal
Communications Bar Association.
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
his state conviction and death sentence. After exhausting his state appeals,
Rees filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, again challenging the constitutionality of
his state conviction and death sentence. The federal district court, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, denied the petition.34
In June 1965, Rhyne filed, with his client's consent, a petition for writ
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.35 Rees's case ceased to follow the
standard path after this point. Prior to the Commonwealth of Virginia filing
its response to the petition for writ of certiorari, Rhyne notified the Clerk of
the Court, and the Commonwealth,36 that Rees had instructed him to
abandon all legal proceedings.37 From this point on, all those involved with
Rees' case-the parties, the lawyers, the psychiatrists, and the
courts-proceeded on untravelled ground.
A. Rees's Demand to Withdraw His Certiorari Petition and His Lawyer's
Concerns About Rees 's Competency to Do So
On July 18, 1965, Rees wrote to Rhyne stating that he wanted to
abandon all legal proceedings in his case. Rhyne traveled to the state
penitentiary to talk to Rees about his letter, but Rees was not dissuaded.
Rhyne then wrote to the Court.38 This first letter to the Clerk of the Court,
John F. Davis, did much more than merely inform the Court of Rees's
decision: Rhyne told the Clerk that he did not believe Rees was competent
to make this decision, provided the basis for that belief, and indicated a
further course of action to assess Rees's mental state. The letter to the Court
included a verbatim recitation of Rees's letter:
34. Rees v. Peyton, 225 F. Supp. 507, 514 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 859, 864
(4th Cir. 1965).
35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31. The petition raised three issues:
prejudicial pretrial publicity; illegal search and seizure of the contents of a locked accordion
case that belonged to Rees but was found in his parents' attic; and implied coercion in
obtaining consent from Rees's father to search the house. Id. at 2-3.
36. The named representative of the Commonwealth was C.C. Peyton, the
Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary. Reno S. Harp, II1, Assistant Attorney
General for the Commonwealth of Virginia represented Virginia in all proceedings in this
case. Harp received his undergraduate and law degrees from Washington and Lee University
in 1954 and 1956, respectively. He was an assistant attorney general for twenty-one years
and then chief counsel to the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Committee until he
retired in 1997. Among other awards he received the Virginia State Bar Association Harry
L. Carrico Professionalism Award and a Distinguished Alumni Award from Washington and
Lee.
37. See Letter from Rhyne, supra note 6.
38.Id.
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Dear Mr. Rhyne,
It is my mature & considered decision to withdraw from before
the U.S. Supreme Ct., as well as from all further consideration, the
petition you recently filed, & that Mr. Crismond, the clerk of
Spotsylvania county ct. be notified that all legal proceedings have
been abandoned.
I would express my appreciation to you & gratitude.
In Dostoyevski's novel "The Bros. Karamozov" Father
Zossimas [sic] elder Brother lay dying, sick & handicapped in
many ways but there was joy in His heart & to those that attended
him he asked how it was that we could go on holding grudges
against one another & always trying to out do one another when we
could be entering the Garden in a Spirit of Love & Friendliness &
brotherhood to live a new & happy life in the Name of Jesus Christ.
Sincerely & Cordially,
M.D. Rees
This letter documented Rees's decision, but it also demonstrated, on its
own, that Rees's reasoning process was somewhat incoherent. Rhyne
included other evidence of Rees's mental state in his letter. He noted that
in 1960, Rees's competence to stand trial on the federal charges had been
questioned. Although the federal district court found Rees competent to
stand trial, psychological evaluations noted that Rees's "'judgment is
relatively poor with respect both to grasp of conventional ideas and to
independent action,' and that at times 'his distinction between fact and
fantasy is poorly maintained and unrealistic ideas and actions are likely to
be numerous."' 39 Rhyne also explained that in 1963 Rees "gave indications
of mental disability."'4 While Rees's "bizarre and unrealistic" complaints
stopped in 1964, Rhyne observed that Rees became increasingly detached
from reality and showed less and less interest in his legal proceedings.
Rhyne noted that when he went to the state prison to talk to Rees about his
letter of instruction to abandon the litigation, Rees
was verbose and discursive. His explanation of his decision to
39. Id. at 2. In addition, a psychiatrist found "no evidence at this time [December 1960]
of a psychosis" and Rees's "contact with reality is certainly not so tenuous that he would be
unable to assist his counsel in adequately defending himself against criminal charges." Id.
(quoting Report of Manfried S. Guttmacher, M.D.).
40. Id. at 3. For example, Rees complained that the prison was drugging him. At Rees's
request, Rhyne had samples of his aspirin, coffee, and tobacco tested. They were not toxic.
Id.
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terminate legal proceedings was marked by numerous attenuated
analogies based on occurrences in the Bible, in secular literature,
in current world events, and in his personal experiences. He
indicated a total absence of concern about whether he lived or died.
His mood, for [sic] the most part serious, at one point alternated
almost instantaneously between laughter and convulsive sobbing.4"
Based on all of these indices-Rees's letter, history, and current mental
state, in addition to Rhyne's belief that waiving one's appeals was
"inconsistent with the strong instinct of self-preservation normally present
in sane persons"-Rhyne expressed considerable doubt about his client's
competence to waive his appeal.42 Although he felt obliged to inform the
Court of Rees's instructions, he also felt obligated to seek psychiatric
advice about Rees's mental status in order to ascertain whether he was
bound to follow Rees's instructions.
While Rhyne arranged for Rees's evaluation, Rees persisted in his
efforts to stop the litigation. Rees wrote to the Clerk of the Court asking that
the petition for writ of certiorari be "accted null + Void + the Circuit court
of Spotsylvania county be so notified ... He wrote to Rhyne asking him
to withdraw as his attorney since Rhyne was not carrying out his decision
to abandon the legal proceedings. In this letter he stated his objection to
Rhyne having him evaluated, writing, "competency determinations are
wholly irrelevant. . ." and concluding, "[t]he only judgment I seek is that
of Christ, to live eternally in His Spirit."44 Rhyne forwarded this letter to the
Clerk of the Court, along with a progress report of his efforts on Rees's
behalf. These included arranging for a psychiatrist, Dr. Oscar Legault, to
evaluate Rees; requesting that medical officers at a federal prison examine
Rees since he was also a federal prisoner; and informing the
Commonwealth that he did not object to its own evaluation of Rees.45
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Letter from Melvin Davis Rees, Jr., Petitioner, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (N.D., stamped rec'd Sept. 27, 1965) (U. S. National Archives).
44. Letter from Melvin Davis Rees, Jr., Petitioner, to S.White Rhyne, Attorney for
Petitioner (N.D., hand marked rec'd Sept. 21, 1965) attached to Letter from S. White Rhyne,
Attorney for Petitioner, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 1965) (U.S.
National Archives).
45. Letter from Rhyne, supra note 44. The Commonwealth, on learning of Rees's stated
intention, agreed that a psychiatrist should examine Rees. Letter from Reno S. Harp, Ill,
Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, to S. White Rhyne, Attorney
for Petitioner (Aug. 17, 1965) (U.S. National Archives). Harp indicated that he understood
the Commonwealth would be given the opportunity to approve of the examining
psychiatrist. Id. Harp stated that he did not know if the Commonwealth would conduct its
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On September 30, 1965, Rhyne sent the Clerk of the Court Dr.
Legault's evaluation of Rees. Dr. Legault's diagnosis was that "Mr. Rees
is at the present time psychotic, suffering from a schizophrenic disorder of
a mixed type with conspicuous paranoid characteristics, and severe
disorganization of thought processes. 46 He concluded: "[t]his man is not
competent to assist in his defense because he is under the influence of a
delusional system which influences his judgement, and also because the
disorganization of his thought and his preoccupation with psychotic matters
prevents his giving sufficient attention to his defense."47
Dr. Legault essentially applied a "competency to stand trial" standard
in assessing Rees's competence to waive his appeals.4" He focused on
Rees's ability to confer with counsel in making decisions about the
litigation, and concluded Rees was not able to do so.49
own examination. Id. I expect that if the first psychiatrist found Rees competent, Harp
thought that the Commonwealth would not need to seek additional psychiatric opinions.
46. Letter from Dr. Oscar Legault, M.D., to S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner
(Sept. 29, 1965) attached to Letter from S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner, to John F.
Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 30, 1965) (U.S. National Archives).
47. Id.
48. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Dr. Legault's test differed from
the one the Court eventually announced in this case. See infra notes 131-37 and
accompanying text. The Court, in Rees's case, focused on the individual's "capacity to
appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning
further litigation." Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966). While the Court emphasized
the individual's ability to make the decision himself as to whether to continue or end the
litigation, Dr. Legault considered Rees's ability to confer with counsel in making that
decision. As Dr. Legault concluded in his report, "[Rees] was not competent.... he was so
preoccupied with spiritual matters that he had no time to pay attention to the world of reality,
and thus could not appropriately assist his counsel in his defense, which was one of the
requirements for competency." Notes of Dr. Oscar Legault on the examination of Melvin
Davis Rees at the Richmond Penitentiary 6 (Sept. 29, 1965) attached to Letter from Rhyne,
supra note 46.
49. In order to assess Rees, Dr. Legault had to go beyond the typical procedure of
having an inmate come to a designated area in the prison for the evaluation. See Notes of
Legault, supra note 48, at 1. When Dr. Legault arrived at the prison, Rees refused to leave
his cell, so Dr. Legault went to see him there. Id. When Rees told him he did not want a
psychiatric examination or interview, Dr. Legault asked if he minded talking to him. Id.
Rees reluctantly agreed, and eventually agreed to go to the room assigned by the prison for
this purpose. Id. at 1-2. Dr. Legault was then able to engage him in conversation by telling
him, after some initial observation, that he had serious doubts about his competency and if
Rees wanted to change Dr. Legault's mind, he would have to talk with him. Id. at 2. This
seemed to work. Id. Based on the ensuing conversation, Dr. Legault observed "external
evidences of serious mental disturbance" as well as "extreme disorganization" of thought.
Id. "He smiles and laughs very inappropriately; his facial expressions are stiff and
manneistic; he also has a manneristic, stereotyped behavior with his tongue, which he
shakes rapidly back and forth inside his mouth, his mouth partly opened, while he blocks in
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Although Dr. Legault was able to examine Rees, he recommended
hospitalizing Rees for a more thorough evaluation." In addition, Dr.
Legault believed that there was an "obvious question of malingering"
because Rees was "a highly intelligent man, well educated, who has had one
course in psychology, has read some psychiatry, and therefore could be
expected to give a fairly sophisticated performance if he chose to
malinger."5 Dr. Legault did not believe that Rees was feigning his mental
illness, but he did believe that psychological testing during the period of
hospitalization could lead to a more accurate assessment of his capacities.52
Based on this report, Rhyne informed the Court, in his letter of
September 30, 1965, that he no longer considered himself bound by Rees's
instructions to withdraw the petition. Further, he intended to file a motion
suggesting how the Court should proceed.53
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Initial Efforts to Determine Whether Rees Was
Competent
On October 4, 1965, at its weekly Friday Conference,54 the Court
considered how to proceed in Rees v. Peyton.55 Justice Brennan's
handwritten notes on a Conference List for October 4 indicate that his vote
was to "Hold" the case.56 His notes show that the Conference voted to
"Grant," but "Hold" was also written in smaller letters to the upper right of
Grant. It is unclear what the Conference thought it would "Grant." A
petition for writ of certiorari had been filed, but the State had not responded
the middle of a sentence." Id. at 2-3.
50. Letter from Dr. Legault, supra note 46. This would allow qualified personnel to
evaluate Rees over an extended period of time in order to obtain objective evidence of his
disorder. Id. Dr. Legault also noted the following:
([A]ctual objective evidence of hallucinatory activity, for example, sometimes
occurs only at night and occasionally.) The personnel in such a setup also have
opportunity to observe how the patient goes about doing many of the simple tasks
of everyday maintenance of himself; how much does he move about, what does
he do all day, etc., in the performance of which clear objective evidence can be
gathered as to what can be going on with the patient.
Id.
51. Id. at 1-2.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Letter from Rhyne, supra note 46.
54. The Justices meet every Friday to discuss and vote on pending cases. An excellent
description of these conferences may be found in ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 38-
41(1974).
55. Justice William J. Brennan, personal Conference List at 16 (Oct. 4, 1965) (Library
of Congress WJB B132 F3).
56. Id.
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on the merits. Rees's attorney had neither filed a motion to stay the
proceedings nor requested any other formal action by the Court. Rees had
requested the Court to consider his petition null and void, but only in a
handwritten letter to the Clerk of the Court-not by way of motion to the
Court. Whatever the Court thought it would "Grant," the result was that the
Court held the case.
On October 5, 1965 the Court received another letter from Rees. 7 Rees
again asked the Court to notify his attorneys that he no longer desired their
representation, to withdraw his petition, and to advise the Circuit Court of
Spotsylvania County that it had done so. The Clerk of the Court responded
to Rees, stating that he had brought both of Rees's letters to the Court's
attention and would let him know when the Court acted on them. 58
On October 13, 1965, Harp, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Commonwealth of Virginia, asked Dr. Joseph R. Blalock, the
Superintendent at the Southwestern State Hospital in Virginia, and Dr.
Harry Brick, a Neuropsychiatrist at the Virginia State Penitentiary, to
examine Rees.5 9 Harp requested that they determine, in light of Dr.
Legault's report, whether "[Rees] is mentally ill."'60 Harp enclosed a copy
of Dr. Legault's report with the letter, but he provided the doctors no other
information about the purpose of the examination. Harp asked for a report
57. Letter from Melvin Davis Rees, Jr., Petitioner, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (N.D., stamped rec'd Oct. 5, 1965) (U.S. National Archives). The letter
states, in part:
I had dismissed my attys from any further obligation or responsibility in the
case, a decision not capriciously arrived at but as a culmination of mature
reflection + consideration + I believe you have been to some extent apprized [sic]
of the interchange between Mr. Rhyne + myself regarding the continuation of the
legal proceedings. My Attys have been very conscientious + look forward to a
legal redress based on prior and present efforts + I am grateful to them + would
that their disappointment were turned to joy + blessing, but they have notified me
that they intend to persist + to disregard my wishes.
Therefore I am writing you in the exercise of my Constitutional rights as an
American Citizen, requesting you to kindly advise my Attys of my prerogative of
choice + representation + confirm my instructions to them that our lawyer-client
relationship has been dissolved, and at the same time withdrawing the petition
from the docket + so advising the Spotsylvania Circuit Court-if you haven't
already done so.
Id.
58. Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Melvin Davis Rees, Jr.,
Petitioner (Oct. 5, 1965) (U.S. National Archives).
59. Letter from Reno S. Harp, III, Attorney General for the Commonwealth ofVirginia,
to Joseph R. Blalock, Superintendent, Southwestern State Hospital (Oct. 13, 1965) (U.S.
National Archives).
60. Id.
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based on a "thorough examination."'" This was not to be.
When Drs. Blalock and Brick went to examine Rees on November 15,
1965, Rees refused to leave his cell, as he had initially with Dr. Legault.
62
Unlike Dr. Legault, however, Drs. Blalock and Block succeeded only in
speaking to Rees at his cell door, where he "refused to enter into
conversation beyond a few words that were noncommittal and evasive,
usually making no reply. 63 Unlike Dr. Legault's report, Drs. Blalock and
Brick's letter to Harp provided no specific examples of his words or actions.
Nonetheless, they concluded that "[n]o overt symptoms of a mental illness
were elicited" and that, based on their limited observation, "we can only
express the impression that he was not psychotic or insane at the time we
examined him. ' 64 They recommended additional observation at a hospital
for the mentally ill.
65
Meanwhile, on October 14, 1965, Rhyne filed a Motion for Stay of
Proceedings with the Court.66 Based on Dr. Legault's report, Rhyne stated
that Rees was "presently insane. '67 Rhyne proposed two possible courses
of action for the Court: one, grant the petition for writ of certiorari and stay
the proceedings, or two, grant the petition and allow Rhyne to continue to
represent Rees or appoint a guardian (Rees's father or Rhyne) to represent
Rees.68 In no event, Rhyne argued, should the Court deny the petition.69
Rhyne based his suggestion to grant the petition and stay the
proceedings on a Supreme Court case from the prior term, Anderson v.
Kentucky, in which the Court had granted certiorari7" but stayed the
proceedings indefinitely by agreement of the parties.7 The Court,
Anderson's attorney, and the Kentucky Attorney General deemed a stay
61. Id.
62. See supra note 49.
63. Letter from Joseph R. Blalock, Superintendent, Southwestern State Hospital and
Harry Brick, Neuropsychiatrist, Virginia State Penitentiary, to Reno S. Harp III, Assistant




66. Attorney for Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Proceedings or Other Appropriate
Relief, Rees v. Peyton (Misc. No. 321) (U.S. National Archives).
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 6-8.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Anderson v. Kentucky, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 886 (1962). The Court granted
certiorari on the question, "[d]id petitioner in a capital case intelligently waive his right to
counsel?" Supreme Court Docket Sheet regarding Anderson v. Kentucky (S-1) (U.S.
National Archives).
71. Anderson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 940 (1964).
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appropriate after three psychiatrists concluded Anderson was "insane and
incompetent to assist in his own appeal. 7 2 Thus, some precedent existed for
the Court to grant certiorari in Rees's case and stay the proceedings.7
In the alternative, Rhyne proposed that the Court appoint a guardian ad
litem for Rees and then hear the case. 4 This could be an appropriate course
of action, Rhyne argued, because the certiorari petition arose in a habeas
corpus case, which is a civil proceeding.7 5 As Rhyne noted, in most civil
cases the litigation does not end because a party becomes insane; rather, a
guardian ad litem is appointed.76 Indeed, the federal habeas corpus statute,
under which Rhyne filed the case, authorized a case to be litigated by
someone acting on the inmate's behalf.
77
While suggesting that the Court could hear the case with Rhyne acting
as Rees's guardian ad litem, the far preferable course, according to Rhyne,
was to grant the petition and stay the proceedings. 78 Rhyne acknowledged
that, if competent, Rees might prefer to proceed with the litigation, but felt
"unable to urge this course of action absent petitioner's knowledgeable
72. The history of Anderson is as intriguing as Rees. Henry Roger Anderson
represented himselfat trial, even though psychiatrists concluded he was mentally ill. Andrew
Wolfson, Mentally Ill Killer has Spent 31 Years on Death Row, THE COURIER-JOURNAL,
June 30, 1991, 1991 WL 6858537 at 3. When he refused to file his own appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court appointed attorneys to represent him. Id. at 4. The attorneys are
the ones who sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. Apparently, after the Court
agreed to hear the case, Anderson himself contacted the Court because he wanted to argue
the case. Id. Wolfson reports that at Chief Justice Warren's request, the attorneys for
Anderson and the State agreed to additional psychological testing and eventually a stay in
light of the results of that testing which found that Anderson was incompetent to represent
himself. Id. at 4-5; see also Paul J. Larkin, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the
Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 768 n.23 (1980) (explaining Anderson's
history).
Like Rees, Anderson stayed on the Court's docket until Anderson died and the Court
dismissed the case. Anderson v. Kentucky, 515 U.S. 1155 (1995).
73. Rhyne cited one other case in support of his proposition to grant and stay: U.S. v.
Washington, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 114, 19 C.M.R. 240 (1955). In Washington, the Court ofMilitary
Appeals struck Washington's appeal and stayed further proceedings in the case until
"Washington regains his sanity." Id. at 125. While both cases supported the proposition that
a court may stay proceedings because of an inmate's mental state, neither involved an
individual who was seeking to waive his appeals.
74. Motion for Stay, supra note 66, at 8.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964)); see infra notes 193-94 (discussing next friend
litigation).
78. Motion for Stay, supra note 66, at 7. "Counsel feel that an indefinite stay would be
in petitioner's best interest." Id.
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advice, which he is of course unable to give."79 Indeed, Rhyne's inability
to consult with Rees also informed his position that the Court could not
deny the petition for writ of certiorari because he would then have to
consult with Rees about whether to file a petition for rehearing, and Rees
was incompetent to participate in any legal decisionmaking. 80
A month after receiving the Motion for Stay, the Court again considered
how to proceed with Rees at its Friday Conference.81 Justice Brennan's
notation on his November 12, 1965 Conference List indicates that the Court
decided to "Ask AG of VA. ' 82 The evident meaning of this notation was
that the Court would ask the Virginia Attorney General for a formal
response to Rhyne's motion. However, letters and notes of telephone
conversations between the Clerk of the Court and the parties suggests that
the goal of the Clerk, and presumably the Court, was an informal
agreement, without further briefing or court order, to have Rees evaluated
in a state hospital.83 The prior term, in Anderson, the Court had followed a
comparable procedure: At Chief Justice Warren's initiation the attorneys
had agreed to, and the Governor of Kentucky had arranged for, a new series
of psychiatric evaluations.84 It appears the Court was hopeful a similar
outcome could ensue here." But, unlike in Anderson, the parties could not
reach an agreement to have Rees evaluated.
Rhyne had no objection to further evaluation in a state hospital and was
willing to cooperate in transferring Rees from the federal prison. Initially
it appeared that Harp was also willing to cooperate as he informed the Clerk
of the Court that, "if the Court desires, Rees can be transferred [to one of
79. Id. "It may well be that if petitioner were able intelligently to make the election he
would feel that it was in his best interest to proceed to the conclusion of the case with the
expectation that the decision would be reversed and the specter of a death sentence would
be removed." Id.
80.Id. at6.
81. See Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 5 (Nov. 12, 1965) (Library of
Congress WJB B132 F3).
82. Id.
83. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
84. See Wolfson, supra note 72, at 1.
85. In a telephone conversation with Rhyne, the Clerk of the Court suggested that "the
Court . . . thought it was desirable that there be a period of observation in a mental
institution, but that whether this was done or how this was done would be left to the parties."
Notes of Telephone Call from John F. Davis at 1 (Jan. 13, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne).Then, in a
letter to Harp, the Clerk stated, a bit cryptically, "If it is necessary that he be hospitalized in
order to carry out the necessary examination, I certainly believe that this is a wise procedure
to take .. " Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Reno S. Harp, 111,
Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 13, 1966) (S.W.
Rhyne).
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two state hospitals] for observation."8 6 By the end of January 1966,
however, Harp's position had shifted: he still agreed that Rees should be
transferred, but now maintained that under Virginia law, transfer could
occur only by "order of a court of competent jurisdiction."87 In February it
looked like progress had been made. Rhyne, after consulting with the Clerk
of the Court, sent the Court an order, signed by both parties, for the Court
to order Rees's temporary transfer to a state hospital for observation.88 But
the process deteriorated from this point on. Following a telephone call from
the Clerk, Rhyne wrote to Harp informing him that, "[I]t is my
understanding that the Chief Justice feels the Court would be hesitant, even
with the consent of the parties, to issue such an order running to the state,
and feels that if a court order is needed application should properly be made
to a state court."89
Harp's response was firm: The state court was "without jurisdiction
under the circumstances of this case to transfer Rees to a state hospital." 9°
He maintained that a state court could order a transfer to a state hospital
only under the commitment statute, but since the Commonwealth's doctors
did not believe that Rees was mentally ill, no basis on which to transfer
Rees existed. 9' According to Harp, only the U.S. Supreme Court had
jurisdiction at this point to order a psychiatric evaluation.92 As a new twist,
Harp added that Rees's sanity could be fully tested in the state courts after
the Supreme Court adjudicated the pending certiorari petition. 93 Harp's
86. Letter from Reno S. Harp, II1, Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth
of Virginia, to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 12, 1966) (referring to the
Central State Hospital at Petersburg, Virginia, or the Southwestern State Hospital in Marion,
Virginia) (S.W. Rhyne).
87. Letter from Reno S. Harp, 11, Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth
of Virginia, to S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner (Jan. 26, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne).
88. Letter from S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner to John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (Feb. 23, 1966) (attaching signed consent order) (U.S. National Archives).
89. Letter from S. White Rhyne, Attorney for Petitioner to Reno S. Harp, 111, Assistant
Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia at 1 (Mar. 4, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne). No
explanation for the Court's hesitancy is provided. The Court may have thought it would
exceed its authority to order the Commonwealth to transfer a state prisoner to a state
institution. Rhyne's letter stated that Davis "suggested that if the state court is concerned
about entering an order" because the case was pending in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
could indicate its consent on the state court transfer order. Id. at 2; see also John F. Davis,
Memorandum for Files (Mar. 3, 1966) (reporting on conversation with Chief Justice that it
would be "preferable for parties to approach a state court.") (U.S. National Archives).
90. Letter from Reno S. Harp, IlI, Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth
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response apparently ended the Clerk's attempt to arrange informally for
Rees's full mental examination.
The Commonwealth formally responded to Rhyne's Motion for Stay on
March 21, 1966, four months after the Court decided to "Ask AG of VA.,
9 4
First, the Commonwealth cast doubt on Rees's incompetence. It argued that
Dr. Legault suggested Rees could be malingering, and that Drs. Blalock and
Brick saw "no overt ... mental illness."95 While acknowledging that all of
the doctors agreed that further observation was required, the
Commonwealth argued, "this is not the proper forum to determine whether
or not this murderer of an entire family is insane."96
The Commonwealth then addressed how the Court could proceed. The
Court should not grant a stay of proceedings, it argued, but should
expeditiously dispose of the case.97 It refused to agree to a continuance as
had the Kentucky Attorney General in Anderson.98 Alternatively, it
considered three actions that the Court could take. First, it suggested that
the Court could order that Rees be evaluated in a state hospital.99 This
would keep the case within the Court'sjurisdiction, so it is unclear how this
course of action squared with the Commonwealth's contention that the
Supreme Court was "not the proper forum" to determine competency.
Second, the Commonwealth proposed that the Court "act" on the petition
for writ of certiorari. Presumably this meant that the Court should deny the
petition, although the State did not explicitly say that. It did, however, point
out that after such action, "there is an available remedy in Virginia whereby
94. Respondent's Answer, Rees v. Peyton (U.S. Supreme Court, Mar. 22, 1966) (Misc.
No. 321) (U.S. National Archives).
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. (noting that an indefinite continuance "is not appropriate in this situation").
99. Id. For the first time, the Commonwealth cited legal authority for the Court to issue
such an order. The Commonwealth cited Snider v. Smith, 263 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1959), on
remand, 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Va. 1960), where the Fourth Circuit remanded a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, filed by an inmate on Virginia's death row, in order for the district
court to explore more fully the inmate's mental state at the time of the crime and at present.
Pursuant to the remand and "in cooperation with the authority of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, petitioner was transferred" from the Virginia penitentiary to a state hospital for the
criminally insane. Snider, 187 F. Supp. at 301. My reading of these cases suggests that the
federal district court did not issue an order of transfer, but that Virginia authorities
cooperated in implementing the transfer, just as the Court wanted them to do here. The Clerk
of the Court may have agreed with this reading: In his April 26, 1966 Memorandum to the
Court he stated "neither [party] has submitted any legal argument sustaining our authority
to take that action [to order Rees's temporary transfer]." Memorandum from John F. Davis,
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justices, U.S. Supreme Court at 3 (Apr. 26, 1966) (U.S.
National Archives).
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petitioner can test his sanity prior to execution."' ' Presumably this meant
that once an execution date was set, Rees's attorneys could seek a judicial
determination as to whether Rees was competent to be executed. If insane,
Rees could not be executed. This was a different question than whether
Rees was competent to abandon his appeals. Given that Rees was seeking
to be executed it was fairly obvious that he would not seek a determination
of his "sanity prior to execution."' 0 ' The Commonwealth's reasoning here
began to reveal its more fundamental argument that Rees was attempting to
avoid execution, not attempting to seek it.
Finally, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the Court could stay the
proceedings.0 2 However, the Commonwealth adamantly opposed this
course of action for two reasons: "it would provide an avenue for a
sophisticated and educated prisoner to escape the final adjudication of his
sentence" and it would "lead[] to a denial of the rights of the people of the
Commonwealth of Virginia in this matter."'0 3 The Commonwealth's
attorney apparently thought that Rees was engaged in a clever and
duplicitous ploy to stay alive, rather than seek execution. Specifically, as a
"sophisticated and educated prisoner," Rees could say that he wanted to
abandon his appeals, but then feign a mental illness that would cause
psychiatrists to find him incompetent to carry out his stated wish.'O° This
would result in a stay of execution. The Commonwealth did not distinguish
between Rees and his counsel but saw only that delay benefitted the defense
writ large: "It is well settled that delay is an asset to the defense and a
hindrance to the prosecution." As long as the case remained in the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Commonwealth concluded, "the prisoner cannot test his
sanity and the people cannot secure a final adjudication."'0 5
Rhyne's reply, filed a week later, maintained that, to date, the only
credible evidence before the Court indicated that Rees was incompetent.' 06
He argued that the Commonwealth's psychiatrists' report was of no value
because it lacked factual support for even its "hazy" impression of Rees's
mental state.107 Nonetheless, he still agreed that the Court should order
further evaluation of Rees in a state hospital.'08 He was confident that this
100. Respondent's Answer, supra note 94, at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Attorney for Petitioner's Reply at 4, Rees, (Misc. No. 321) (U.S. National
Archives).
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 5.
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evaluation would result in the Commonwealth's doctors concluding that
Rees was incompetent and that the Commonwealth, therefore, would agree
to a stay of the proceedings." 9 However, Rhyne conceded that if the
psychiatrists found Rees competent and provided a factual basis for that
opinion, a hearing would be appropriate."' Rhyne proposed that such a
hearing occur before a federal district court judge. This was the first
suggestion that the Court should remand the case to federal district court to
hear evidence on whether Rees was competent to withdraw his petition for
writ of certiorari.
Finally, Rhyne emphasized that the competency question at issue was
Rees's ability to participate in the U.S. Supreme Court proceedings."' This
was not the same, as the Commonwealth had suggested, as whether he was
sane enough to be executed or even competent to stand trial a second time
should the Court reverse his conviction and sentence. Thus he maintained
that the Court should determine Rees' s competency to litigate in this Court,
and should grant the petition and proceed to consider the merits of the case
or grant the petition and stay the proceedings." 2
C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision to Remand the Case for an
Assessment of Rees's Competency
By April 1966, the Court had been fully briefed by the parties on how
to proceed in this matter. But the Court again tried to encourage an
agreement on the procedure to follow, short of an order from the Court." 3
At Chief Justice Warren's instructions, the Clerk of the Court met
personally with Rhyne and Harp to discuss "the possibility of there being
an independent determination of Mr. Rees's competence to carry on his
defense at the present time."''
14
109. Id.
110. Id. at 6. Rhyne was particularly concerned that the examining doctors provide
factual support for their conclusions because Drs. Blalock and Brick did not. As Rhyne
observed "[tihe 'report' was notable for its brevity and complete lack of any factual basis
for even the hazy 'impression' which it expressed." Id. at 3. Thus Rhyne believed that a
hearing should occur only if "there is a clear issue as to petitioner's mental competency...
•"Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Memorandum of telephone conversation with S. White Rhyne, Attorney for
Petitioner, and John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 13, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne).
Indeed, in one telephone call between Davis and Rhyne, it appears that Davis suggested that
Rhyne's motion had put the Court in a quandary and he wanted to find an alternative
solution. Id.
114. Memorandum from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Chief
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The meeting resulted in a set of convoluted proposals. As explained by
the Court Clerk in his memo summarizing the meeting, Harp maintained
that the Commonwealth had no authority to transfer Rees from a state
prison to a hospital for an evaluation because the state commitment
processes did not apply to prisoners, and a prisoner's competence could be
evaluated only if prison officials believed the prisoner was incompetent,
which they did not. 15 The Court, however, did not want to order the
transfer. Therefore, the parties and the Court had to consider other possible
procedures. As outlined by the Clerk, the first alternative was that the
Commonwealth could file a declaratory judgment action seeking a
determination of Rees's competence in the state court. 116 This might require
a letter from the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court stating that such ajudicial
determination was appropriate." 7 Second, the Court could order Rhyne to
seek a state court determination of Rees's competence." 8 Or, finally, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons could transfer Rees to the Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri where doctors would examine
him.' ' If the doctors found Rees incompetent, this might provide a basis for
the Court to then order a judicial determination of Rees's competence. The
Clerk recommended the declaratory judgment action as the most advisable
step, 2° perhaps because it was the most direct route to a judicial
determination of Rees's competence that did not require any action by the
Court. 11
Over the next month, Rees appeared on the Court's Friday Conference
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 19, 1966) (U.S. National Archives). The contents of this
memo also appear in an expanded form. See Memorandum from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (Apr. 26, 1966) (U.S. National Archives). It may be that the Clerk wrote this
longer memo for the other Justices.
115. Memorandum from Clerk, Apr. 19, 1966, supra note 114, at 1. The
Commonwealth's position seems obstructionist. Harp had made clear that the
Commonwealth did not believe Rees was incompetent and that this proceeding was a ruse
to avoid execution, thus thwarting the will of the people of Virginia. Harp may have hoped
that in light of the complexity and uncertainty over how to determine Rees's competence,
the Court would tire of the case, deny the petition, and be done with the matter.




120. Memorandum from Clerk, Apr. 26, 1966, supra note 114, at 4.
121. The need for a judicial determination of competency appears as a new concern in
the April 26, 1966 memo. Id. at 2. Previously, however, on April 13, 1966, in a telephone
conversation between Davis and Rhyne, Davis suggcsted that Rhyne should consider
obtaining a court adjudication of incompetence rather than rest on the documents on file
with the Court. See Rhyne Memorandum, supra note 113.
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list almost every week. 122 On May 13, 1966 Justice Brennan's notation
under "Conference Vote" read, "Send back to DC for hearing on
competency."'' 23 Finally, on May 24, 1966, Justice Harlan circulated a
Memorandum to the Conference with a proposed order that "attempts to
reflect our Conference discussion as to an appropriate disposition of this
matter."'' 24 The Conference voted to issue a per curiam order on May 26,
1966125 and issued the Order on May 31, 1966.126
In its per curiam order the Court charted its own course of action both
by defining the question of competency that was at issue and how it would
be resolved. The Court observed that the fundamental issue was whether
Rees should be allowed to withdraw his pending petition for writ of
certiorari. 127 The Court decided that "in aid of the proper exercise of this
Court's certiorari jurisdiction" the federal district court should make an
initial determination of Rees's competence and the Court would make the
final decision as to how to proceed in the case. The Court, significantly, had
concluded that it, not a state court, would decide the issues at hand.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, in general, is a court of appellate
jurisdiction, so it was not in a position to hear evidence and make an initial
determination. 128 The Court, therefore, remanded the case to the federal
district court where this proceeding-i.e., the petition for writ of habeas
corpus-had begun. It directed the district court "to render a judicial
122. See Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 4 (Apr. 29, 1966) ("over until
5/2"); Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 5 (May 13, 1966); Justice Brennan's
personal Conference List at 2 (May 20, 1966) ("over"); Justice Brennan's personal
Conference List at 2 (May 26, 1966) (Library of Congress WJB B132 F3).
123. Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 5 (May 13, 1966).
124. Memorandum to the Conference from J.M.H., Supreme Court Justice to Justices,
U.S. Supreme Court (May 24, 1966) (Library of Congress WJB B133 F2). No order was
attached to the memorandum in Justice Brennan's file. It is an assumption on my part that
the order the Justices voted on and issued is the same as the one Justice Harlan proposed.
125. Brennan's personal Conference List at 2 (May 26, 1967) (Library of Congress
WJB B132 F3).
126. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
127. "Whether or not Rees shall be allowed in these circumstances to withdraw his
certiorari petition is a question which it is ultimately the responsibility of this Court to
determine, in the resolution of which Rees' [sic] mental competence is of prime
importance." Id. at 313.
128. The Court has original jurisdiction over few matters, principally suits between two
states. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting the Court's original jurisdiction to "all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls and those in which a state shall
be a party"); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 461-90 (7th ed. 1993)
(explaining the cases over which the Court has exercised its original jurisdiction). Even
when the Court has original jurisdiction, it usually refers the case to a specially appointed
master to hear evidence on factual disputes and report back to the Court. Id. at 487-88.
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determination as to Rees' [sic] mental competence and render a report on
the matter to US.'
1 2 9
The Order then stated the standard for determining "Rees' [sic] mental
competence in the present posture of things": '30 "[W]hether he has capacity
to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he
is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
substantially affect his capacity in the premises."'' While not a model of
clarity, 32 the question posed sought the district court's assessment of
whether Rees was able to understand the current situation and make a
rational choice about the pending litigation or whether he was mentally ill
in a way that might impair his ability to do so."3 First, this query was
directed at determining whether Rees could make a rational judgment about
abandoning the litigation, i.e., his instruction to the Court to withdraw his
pending petition. But the Court went beyond the narrow question of
whether it should honor Rees's request to withdraw the petition. 34 It also
inquired as to his ability to make a considered judgment about continuing
the litigation.'35 This suggests that if the district court found Rees
incompetent, the Court could decide that litigation would not proceed at all
because he would not be able to make rational choices as it continued.
129. Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
130. Id.
131. Id. This test continues to be the standard for assessing competency to waive
appeals in death penalty cases. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 400-01 (4th ed. 2001). As Hertz and Liebman note,
"subsequent adjudications refine both aspects of this formulation and recognize the propriety
of analogies to the well-developed legal standards governing a defendant's
competency-and the Voluntariness of any decision he makes-to confess, plead guilty, or
waive other constitutional rights." Id. at 401.
132. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 131, at 401 n.68 (noting that "[tihe Rees
standard, the relationship between its two clauses, and the degree to which it poses purely
factual, or mixed factual-legal, questions has occasioned uncertainty"). Compare, e.g.,
Franklin v. Francis, 997 F. Supp. 916, 927 (E.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the Ohio Supreme
Court misapplied Rees because it did not consider the second part of the test: "if the
affecting condition is serious enough to raise substantial doubt as to the unfettered capacity
of a person to make a rational choice, then the Rees standard requires a court, in the exercise
of caution and for the protection of that person's constitutional rights, to find the person to
be incompetent.") and Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing the
district court decision and holding that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly applied Rees: "The
test is not conjunctive but rather is alternative. Either the condemned has the ability to make
a rational choice with respect to the proceeding or he does not have the capacity to waive
his rights as a result of his mental disorder.").
133. Rees, 384 U.S. at 313.
134. Id. at 314.
135. Id.
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Second, the query acknowledged the uncertain relationship between mental
illness and rational choice. The question asked whether Rees is "suffering
from a mental disease, disorder or defect that may substantially affect his
capacity" in this situation, not whether the mental disease, disorder or defect
has conclusively done so.' 3 6 This formulation left open the possibility that
Rees could be mentally ill in a way that did not affect his judgment about
the litigation. More important, however, it acknowledged the possibility that
one could find Rees incompetent, based on his mental illness, even if a finn
correlation could not be established. 137
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Courts disagree about the assessment the district court is to make under Rees. In
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985) the majority distinguished between
a mental disease that impaired one's cognitive function from one's volitional function,
which it considered "[t]he person's ability to make a rational choice among available
options." Id. at 399. Judge Goldberg, in dissent, maintained that the majority misapplied
Rees with respect to rational choice which he read to mean logical and autonomous choice:
"If a person takes logical steps toward a goal that is substantially the product of a mental
illness, the decision in a fundamental sense is not his: He is incompetent." Id. at 404
(Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also Matthew T. Norman, Note, Standards and Procedures
for Determining Whether a Defendant is Competent to Make the Ultimate Choice-Death;
Ohio's New Precedentfor Death Row "Volunteers," 13 J. L. & HEALTH 103,123 (1998-99)
("If courts are going to use the 'Rees Standard,' they must differentiate between a
defendant's logical choice, which can be reflected in a realistic appreciation of one's legal
and/or psychological status, and a defendant's rational decision, which by definition
contemplates a goal that is the product of one's free will.").
Rees has been criticized on a number of issues. Some have criticized Rees for not
inquiring into the individual's ability to consult with his attorney. See, e.g., State v.
Torrence, 451 S.E.2d 883, 884 (S.C. 1994) (stating the test for waiver of state court appeals
as "whether the defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he or she was
tried for, the reason for the punishment, and whether the convicted defendant possesses
sufficient capacity or ability to rationally communicate with counsel").
Others have found fault with the test because it does not inquire into the individual's
capacity to choose between life and death. See Welsh White, Defendants Who Elect
Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 867 (1987) (noting that the Rees standard is comparable
to the competence to stand trial test, even though "the decisions involved in the two
situations are entirely different," and positing that the waiver test should encompass the
defendant's "capacity to choose between life and death"). At least three states have
incorporated the capacity to choose between life and death into their state competence to
waive appeals test. See Franz v. State, 754 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Ark. 1989) ("A defendant will
be able to forego a state appeal only if he has been judicially determined to have the capacity
to understand the choice between life and death and to knowingly and intelligently waive
any and all rights to appeal his sentence."); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86 (Wash. 1992)
(adopting the Arkansas standard); Grasso v. Oklahoma, 857 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1993) (adopting
the Arkansas standard).
Some scholars argued for a different test altogether. See Christy Chandler, Note,
Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1897, 1922 (1998) (arguing that competency to
waive one's appeals should be higher than competency to stand trial and proposing that the
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Based on the directives in its opinion, the Court remanded the matter to
the federal district court with directions to have Rees examined, and if
necessary, temporarily hospitalized in a federal facility for that purpose. 1
38
Further, it permitted the Commonwealth to examine Rees at its own
institutions should it so choose. Thus, whatever obstacles the
Commonwealth perceived in obtaining its own evaluation at a state facility
were now the Commonwealth's, not the Court's, to work out. Finally, the
Court ordered the district court to hold hearings "as it deem[ed] suitable,"
permitting the Commonwealth and all interested parties to participate
"should they so desire,"'139 and then to report its findings and conclusions to
the Court.14
0
The official record of U.S. Supreme Court proceedings in Rees contains
only two more citations: one, its decision in April 1967 to hold the case,
14 1
and the other, in October 1995, dismissing the petition. 142 But before and
between those two official notations, much more occurred.
D. The Proceedings on Remand
1. Federal District Court Hearings
In July 1966, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, Judge Oren R. Lewis held the first hearing after the Supreme
Court's remand. 143 At this hearing Judge Lewis sought to establish whether
standard should "provide a presumption of incompetence"); G. Richard Strafer, Vohnteering
For Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention,
74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 876-79 (1983) (maintaining that the test is "inadequate,
however, to protect either the individual's or the State's interests in administering the death
penalty," and proposing that "those who because of mental illness, would be likely to make
decisions about their own interests which would result in substantial damage to their mental
or physical well-being" be deemed incompetent to waive their appeals).
138. The Court cited "cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4245" as authority for the district court to
subject Rees to these examinations. Rees, 384 U.S. at 314. These statutory provisions
authorize the district court to order an evaluation of an individual's competency to stand
trial. Given the unique nature of this proceeding, that was, apparently, close enough for the
Court.
139. Id. Presumably, Rees was an interested party who might desire to participate. This
reference is the closest the Court came to recognizing Rees's separate interest in the
proceedings. On remand, the district court judge asked Rees if he wanted his own attorney.
See infra notes 144-45.
140. Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
141. Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
142. Rees v. Superintendent, 516 U.S. 802 (1995).
143. Transcript of Proceedings, Rees v. Peyton (E.D. Va. July 6, 1966) (No. 2970-M)
(S.W. Rhyne).
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Rees wanted the assistance of counsel.'" This was the only time in the
entire case that a court officer queried Rees about his legal position in the
case. Rees never directly responded. Instead, he provided a meandering
statement about the role of God in the search for justice and his desire for
the Supreme Court, without inquiring into his competence or motives, to
grant his request to withdraw the certiorari petition.145 Judge Lewis did
ascertain that Rees understood the likely consequence of withdrawing his
petition: the Commonwealth of Virginia would execute him. Rees's
response, however, was insufficient to conclude that he was competent to
waive his appeal: the standard announced by the Court was whether Rees's
choice was rational, not solely whether he understood its consequences.
Judge Lewis concluded that Rees should be examined at the federal medical
center in Springfield, Missouri." The Commonwealth complied with Judge
Lewis's order and, over the next three months, a team of doctors evaluated
Rees at the Springfield facility.
In October 1966, Judge Lewis held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Rees was competent to abandon the litigation challenging his
conviction and death sentence.'47 Dr. Legault and three doctors, who were
part of the team that had observed and examined Rees at the federal medical
center, testified. 48 Each doctor concluded that Rees was suffering from
schizophrenia and was not competent to make the decision to withdraw his
petition for writ of certiorari. 149 In large measure, they based their
assessment on Rees's preoccupation with God to the exclusion and
meaninglessness of anything in this world, including the present
litigation. 5° At one point during the Commonwealth's cross-examination
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. at 3-9.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Transcript of Proceedings, Rees v. Peyton (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 1966) (No. 2970-M)
(S.W. Rhyne).
148. Id. at 2. The doctors at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners were: Milton
Herbert Buschman, Staff Psychiatrist; Arthur McLean Hildreth, Staff Psychiatrist; and
Howard C. Wilinsky, Acting Chief of Psychiatry. Id Each doctor from the federal medical
center submitted a written report to the Court. See Buschman, Report of Psychiatric
Examination, Aug. 3, 1966; Hildreth, Report of Psychiatric Examination, July 25, 1966;
Wilinsky, Report of Psychiatric Examination, Aug. 11, 1966 (S.W. Rhyne). In addition they
submitted ajoint report. See Joint Report of Psychiatric Staff Examination regarding Melvin
Davis Rees, Jr. (S.W. Rhyne).
149. See Transcript, Oct. 17, 1966, supra note 147, at 27 (Hildreth); at 62 (Wilinsky);
at 75 (Buschman); at 87 (Legault).
150. As Dr. Hildreth testified: "his pre-occupations with religiosity are of such
magnitude that they exclude his ability to assess reality.. .in a logical manner." Id. at 26.
The doctors' reports also stated this. As Dr. Wilinsky wrote, "[w]hen asked if he knew the
implications of his current legal actions he blocked. When pressed on this issue the patient
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of one of the doctors, Rees interrupted and the court allowed him to speak
on this matter:
MR. REES: And into a new creation where judgment has been
rendered, where judgment overall [sic] heaven and earth has been
established.... That is not a matter of superfluous judgment but is
a matter of very meaningful judgment and as consequences for all
men, as all men are in life in the same spirit enjoying the same
benevolence, the same presence of God as God Himself has
intended and as given.'5 '
The court took this opportunity to ask Rees about his decision to withdraw
his petition.
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Rees, while you are standing, I will again
ask you, do you want to withdraw your petition from the Supreme
Court of the United States?
MR. REES: The petition is a superfluous thing. I (pause) find that
the petition is irrelevant to the purposes of judgment, that is, that
judgment comes from the universe, from the God of the universe,
from the sources of grace and life and is not a matter of-
THE COURT: As I understand it, then, you prefer to be judged by
God than by the Supreme Court, is that correct?
MR. REES: Well, yes.'5 2
The Commonwealth presented no witnesses at the hearing. However,
Harp, the Commonwealth's attorney, used his cross-examination of each
finally stated that it was 'revealed' that he would be judged by a higher court, thus making
procedures by 'earthly courts as compared with Godly courts' irrelevant." Wilinsky, supra
note 148, at 1-2. The Psychiatric Staff Report stated:
He has been noted to be consistently delusional with respect to his receiving
devine [sic] revelation and being one with God, perhaps God himself. Because of
this, Mr. Rees has repeatedly stated that legal procedures and judgments by any
court of law have no relation to him. He stated, "I have had certain revelations
made to me that have informed direction of my thought in the light of which I
have reconstrued my view of the world, my place in the world ... not only
nationally but internationally as well. I dismissed my attorney because I
recognized that my advocate was Christ Himself." Thus any choice that he has
made with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation is based entirely
on delusional thinking.
Joint Report of Psychiatric Staff Examination, supra note 148, at 2.
151. Transcript, Oct. 17, 1966, supra note 147, at 70.
152. Id. at 70-71.
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psychiatrist to hone in on the Commonwealth's basic contention that Rees
was malingering. As in its Answer filed with the Supreme Court, Harp
persisted in trying to show that Rees was feigning mental illness "in an
effort to escape the electric chair."' 53
One month after the hearing, Harp filed a motion requesting the federal
district court to order Rees evaluated in the Virginia Central State
Hospital. 5 4 Immediately after the October hearing, the federal prison had
transferred Rees to the state hospital to serve his concurrent state and
federal sentences. Thus, whatever difficulties the Commonwealth had
perceived in transferring Rees to the state hospital no longer existed. Rhyne
objected on the grounds that the court had given the Commonwealth
numerous opportunities to evaluate Rees prior to the hearing.'55
Nonetheless, the court granted Harp's request. 56
The examinations at the Central State Hospital did not aid the
Commonwealth's position that Rees was malingering. The two doctors who
evaluated Rees agreed that he "is not fully competent to make a rational
choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation in his
behalf."' 57 As had the other psychiatrists who evaluated Rees, these doctors
believed that "Rees appears to be suffering from a rather fixed pattern of
thinking that the whole matter of his future is in the hands of God and that
he doesn't care or appreciate the significance of any decisions made by
anyone."' 58
153. Id. at 22-23. Despite the fact that every doctor concluded that he did not believe
Rees was malingering, Harp repeatedly asked each doctor whether it was possible that he
was. Of course, each had to state that it was possible, because medical science does not
concern itself with absolutes but with degrees of medical certainty. The judge had expressed
his own frustration with the limits of medical science on this issue. At one point he asked,
"[w]hat I want to know is, can't you tell with reasonable medical certainty-I mean whether
the person by his consistency and by truth serums and all these other drugs that you have
whether he is fooling you or not-I mean is there any doubt in your mind about it?" Id. at
79. Dr. Buschman replied, "I feel there is reasonably no doubt .... Id. This seemed to
satisfy the judge but not the Commonwealth, as Harp again raised the possibility of feigning
mental illness with the next doctor who testified. Id. at 88-90.
154. Respondent's Motion, Rees v. Peyton (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 1966) (No. 2970-M) (S.
W. Rhyne).
155. Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reopen the Record at 2, Rees v. Peyton
(E.D. Va. filed Nov. 17, 1966) (No. 2970-M) (S. W. Rhyne).
156. Order, Rees v. Peyton (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 1966) (No. 2970-M) (S. W. Rhyne).
157. Letter from Dr. Milton H. Kibbe, Superintendent, Central State Hospital, and Dr.
Joseph R. Blalock, Superintendent, Southwestern State Hospital, to Judge Oren R. Lewis
(Dec. 16, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne).
158. Id. The doctors noted that, "[n]one of his reactions while under observation here
have been indicative of an overt or definite psychosis"; rather, they though he suffered from
"Transient Situational Personality Disturbance, Adult Situational Reaction." Id. Three days
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2. Federal District Court Report Concluding Rees Was Incompetent
Judge Lewis filed his "Report on Petitioner's Mental Competence" with
the Supreme Court on January 12, 1967.' He concluded: "Melvin Davis
Rees, Jr. cannot at this time make a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation in his behalf. He is suffering
from a major mental disorder, schizophrenic reaction, chronic
undifferentiated type, affecting his capacity in the premises."' 6 °
Judge Lewis based his conclusion on the reports and testimony of
doctors who examined Rees at three institutions,'6 ' as well as his own
observations of Rees at the federal district court hearings. Judge Lewis
noted that at the first hearing in July 1966, Rees had appeared coherent, if
a bit dazed (this was his first time off of death row in five years). 62
However, he had to be "forcibly put on the airplane" for transfer to the
federal medical center in Missouri.163 At the medical center, he was
suspicious and incoherent and refused to wear any clothing. 164 Eventually
the doctors ordered Rees tranquilized so that they at least could physically
examine him. 65 Initially, however, the only result of tranquilizing Rees was
that he began to wear pajamas. 66 Over the next three months, Rees slowly
grew less suspicious of the doctors and began speaking to them.' 67 The
judge summarized Rees's mental state during those months:
He was aware that he was under sentence for murder and that his
attempt to end litigation would result in his execution. It took many
interviews, however, to discover this because he would answer
later Dr. Kibbe wrote a follow-up letter because Dr. Blalock and he thought, "there may be
some question regarding our statements on the competency and mental state of Mr. Rees."
Letter from Dr. Milton H. Kibbe, Superintendent, Central State Hospital, to Judge Oren R.
Lewis (Dec. 19, 1966) (S.W. Rhyne). In this second letter they opined that, "Rees is not
psychotic." Id. However, they immediately reiterated that, "[b]ecause of his extreme
negativistic attitude and because of his ideas of a religious nature, it is highly improbable
that he would adequately cooperate with counsel." Id.
159. Report on Petitioner's Mental Competence at 1-2, Rees v. Peyton (E.D. Va. Jan.
12, 1967) (No. 2970-M) (U.S. National Archives).
160. Id. at 1-2.
161. Id. at 2 (Dr. Legault at the Virginia State Penitentiary; Drs. Hildreth, Buschman,
and Wilinsky at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri; and Drs.
Blalock and Kibbe at the Central State Hospital in Petersburg, Virginia).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id.
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questions piecemeal, often drifting off into incoherencies and
meaningless thoughts.
Rees has many delusions of grandeur. He feels in an exalted
state because he feels he has had certain special revelations from
God. He has allowed his fantasies to supersede a rational
assessment of reality and has developed a marked inappropriateness
of thought, feeling and behavior. 6
8
At the evidentiary hearing, Rees "was unkempt and required constant
attention lest he take his clothes off in the courtroom."' 169 He repeatedly
interrupted the proceedings with "unrelated and incoherent statements."1 70
The combination of the doctors' medical opinions and his own observations
led the judge to report that Rees was not competent to make the choice to
continue or abandon the litigation."'
E. The Court's Decision to Stay the Proceedings in Rees
1. The Parties'Positions on how the Court Should Proceed in Light of
Rees's Incompetency
Following the district court's submission of its report to the U.S.
Supreme Court in January 1967, Rhyne and Harp submitted memoranda
stating how each thought the case should proceed.'72 They agreed that the
Court could not follow Rees's wishes to withdraw the petition, but they
diverged from that point on. Rhyne proposed, as he had previously, that the
Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari and stay the proceedings.
173
This step would require no action by Rees, would notify the Fourth Circuit
168. Id.
169. Id. at 5-6. During the hearing itself, Dr. Hildreth testified that the hospital had
taken Rees off of the tranquilizers so that the drugs would not "obscure the issue" for the
court. Transcript, Oct. 17, 1966, supra note 147, at 40. This proved to be an important action
because the judge was quite attentive to Rees throughout the evidentiary hearing. Many
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of an individual appearing
before the trier of fact in an unmedicated condition when his mental state is at issue. See
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that a defendant could not be medicated
against his will at trial when his mental state at the time of the crime was an issue at trial).
170. Report on Petitioner's Mental Competence, supra note 159, at 6.
171. Id. at 1-2.
172. Attorney for Petitioner's Memorandum Re Proper Procedure Following Judicial
Finding of Petitioner's Mental Incompetence, Rees v. Peyton (U.S. Supreme Court, Feb. 16,
1967) (Misc. No. 9) (U.S. National Archives); Respondent's Memorandum, Rees v. Peyton
(U.S. Supreme Court, Mar. 14, 1967) (Misc. No. 9) (U.S. National Archives).
173. Petitioner's Memorandum, supra note 172, at 5.
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Court of Appeals that its denial of Rees's habeas petition was under review,
and would be consistent with the Court's treatment of Anderson v.
Kentucky.'74 Rhyne maintained that to deny the petition for writ of
certiorari, or grant it without a stay, would require a response by Rees.'75
Given that the district court found that Rees was incompetent to decide to
abandon or continue the litigation, Rhyne argued, it was untenable to take
any action that would require a response from Rees because any decision
he might make would be influenced by his mental illness.' 76
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, urged the Court to dispose of
the case either by granting or denying the petition, and contended that in no
event should the Court stay the proceedings. 77 The Commonwealth felt that
it was imperative that the Court decide the merits of the appeal, i.e., whether
the trial court's judgment to convict and sentence Rees to death was
correct. 7 8 Denying the petition would do this without delay. If the Court
granted the petition and then granted relief, the Commonwealth wanted it
done immediately "while the witnesses [were] still available."' 79
If the litigation ended in the Supreme Court, Rees would return to the
Virginia state courts. If the Court denied the certiorari petition, no legal
barrier would exist to the Commonwealth seeking an execution date. The
Commonwealth did not say it would do so, but it alluded to the possibility
by stating, "[s]hould this Court deny certiorari it is obvious that his attorney
would ask Virginia not to execute this man because of his mental
condition." 8 ' Rhyne would have no cause to do that unless Rees was facing
an actual execution date. The Commonwealth was quick to note, however,
"[i]t is obvious that Virginia does not desire to execute an insane
defendant."' 8' Apparently as some assurance, the Commonwealth indicated
that as long as Rees remained at the hospital for the criminally insane, he
would not be executed. 81 Still, by raising the possibility that it might seek
to execute Rees, the Commonwealth seemed to affirm its long-held opinion
that Rees was, or would be found, competent in a state court proceeding.'83
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5-6.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Respondent's Memorandum, supra note 172, at 2. As the Commonwealth
unknowingly, yet presciently put it, "[t]o do otherwise will leave the case in legal limbo
which could continue until the Petitioner's demise by natural causes." Id at 2-3.





183. Id. The possibility of a new trial, "[s]hould this man regain his sanity," also
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2. The Court's Deliberations
Once both parties submitted memoranda on how the Court should
proceed, the Court placed Rees on the March 24, 1967 Conference List.'84
According to Justice Brennan's notes, he voted to "Grant" and "Stay," but
the Conference voted that "further consideration of petition for certiorari is
postponed." 185 We gain some insight into the Justices' concerns from a
Clerk's Memorandum written to Chief Justice Warren after the Conference
vote. 186 On instructions to the Clerk, presumably from Chief Justice Warren,
the Clerk again conferred with Rhyne and Harp about the Court's proposed
disposition of the case.'87 It appears from the memo that, as the Conference
vote indicated, the Court intended to hold the case and not take any action
on the pending petition for writ of certiorari. 88 The Clerk's memo
concluded that neither Harp nor Rhyne objected to this, "but neither of them
accept[ed] it with enthusiasm., 189
According to the Clerk's memo, Harp reiterated his concern about the
delay in retrying Rees, if so required. He stated that the trial evidence was
available now, and might be difficult to reassemble later. As in its
Memorandum to the Court, the Commonwealth appeared to acknowledge
that it would not retry Rees unless he was competent. The Clerk wrote,
"[s]ince the State certainly would not try Rees at a time when he would not
be competent to defend himself, it seems that this delay results, not so much
from the Court's failure to act, as from the underlying circumstances of the
case."'
190
Rhyne still thought the Court should grant the petition and then stay the
proceedings. The Clerk noted, "[h]e has no suggestion as to the propriety
of the Court considering the petition if it does not feel free to deny it as well
suggests that the Commonwealth did not believe that Rees would remain incompetent for
long. Id.
184. Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 2 (Mar. 24, 1967) (Library of
Congress WJB B145 F4).
185. Id. The Court's Conference List noted that, in addition to the District Court's
Report, the transcript of the hearings and associated papers were on file in the Clerk's office,
as were the memoranda from both attorneys. Conference List for March 24, 1967 (List 1,
Sheet 2). (Library of Congress WJB B147 F3).
186. Memorandum from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Chief Justice




190. Id. at 1.
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as grant it." '' 9
The Clerk's notation highlights the dilemma facing the Justices: if they
were to take any action, they could not simply grant the petition. Rather,
they had to fully decide, based on the underlying merits of the case, whether
to grant or deny it. The Court's decision about how to proceed, consistent
with its responsibility as a Court, had to be unhindered. It would be
untenable for the Court to decide to grant the petition without considering
whether to deny it. The district court, however, had determined that Rees
was incompetent to choose whether to abandon or continue the litigation.
If the Court initiated the process of deciding whether to grant or deny the
petition, it would necessitate doing exactly what the district court concluded
Rees was incompetent to do-decide whether to proceed. As Rhyne argued,
if the Court denied the petition, Rhyne would have to consult with Rees
about filing a petition for rehearing. Yet, Rees's incompetence precluded a
rational choice about taking that step. So too, if the Court granted the
petition, Rees was incompetent to decide to allow his attorney to proceed. 1
92
This conundrum suggested that the case should not proceed at all because
Rees's mental illness would substantially affect any decision he made
regarding the litigation.
One other option existed-that Rhyne continue with the litigation on
Rees's behalf As Rhyne observed in his Motion for Stay of the
Proceedings, the federal habeas statute contemplated that the petition for
writ of habeas corpus could be brought by the petitioner or someone acting
on his behalf. A "next friend" may litigate on someone's behalf if the
person has been found mentally incompetent, as had Rees.
193
As Rees's next friend, Rhyne could continue the litigation challenging
the constitutionality of Rees's conviction and sentence. This would allow
the Court to complete its consideration of Rees's certiorari petition.'9 4 The
191. Id.
192. Because Rhyne thought that the Court should grant the petition and immediately
stay the proceedings, he did not see a problem with the Court taking these two steps.
Combined, they posed no issue on which Rhyne would need to consult with Rees.
193. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161-66 (1990) (discussing the historical
basis of, and prerequisites for, proceeding by next friend, including the reason the prisoner
cannot seek his own relief, such as mental incompetence); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
131, at 384-401 (explaining the requirements for proceeding by next friend and noting that
the device has been used primarily in death penalty cases where the inmate is seeking to end
legal proceedings and be executed).
194. From 1976 through 2002, 820 executions occurred in the United States. Death
Row U.S.A., supra note 23, at 11-27. Of those, 97 were inmates who were found competent
to waive his or her appeals and then were executed. See id. (showing those who waived their
appeals by designated them with *). In contrast, I have documented only seven instances,
since 1976, where a court determined that an inmate was incompetent to waive his appeals.
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Court, however, never seemed to give this procedure much consideration;
at least the Clerk of the Court never raised it as a possible way to proceed.
It may have been that larger concerns about death penalty cases contributed
to the Court's judgment about how to proceed in Rees.19 5 The combination
of those concerns and Rees's incompetence may have made the Court
reluctant to proceed at all, at this point in time. At the April 7, 1967
Conference, the Justices considered how to proceed in Rees. The Court
voted to hold the case. 196 The order, officially entered on April 10, 1967,
In five of these cases the litigation continued through a next friend. John Cockrum's attorney
litigated his case as next friend. See In re John Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Tex. 1994)
(finding Cockrum incompetent to waive his appeals); Cockrum v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp.
1417 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (granting relief on habeas petition with attorney proceeding as next
friend), rev'don merits, 119 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1997). Michael Robert O'Rourke's attorney
litigated his case as next friend. See O'Rourke v. Endell, 153 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998)
(denying relief on the merits). O'Rourke later died of natural causes. E-mail from Jeff
Rosenzweig (May 1, 2001) (on file with author). Colin Clark was found incompetent to
waive his appeals by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (E-mail correspondence
on file with author). Later, the court granted relief on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
See Clark v. Louisiana State Pen., 697 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing conviction due
to improper jury instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Kevin Scudder was found
incompetent by a magistrate in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
Kevin Scudder's attorney litigated his case as next in friend. Shank v. Mitchell, No. C2-00-
0017 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2001). The case is proceeding with his attorney as next friend.
Author conversation with attorney. Kenneth Stewart was found incompetent by the Circuit
Court, Bedford County, Virginia and counsel was ordered to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Commonwealth v. Kenneth Manuel Stewart, Jr., No. 194621, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct.
Bedford Cty. Apr. 4, 1995) (finding Stewart lacked the "requisite capacity to waive legal
remedies," and ordering counsel to file petition for writ of habeas corpus). Stewart later
decided to proceed with his appeals and was executed in 1998. E-mail from Michele Brace
(May 1, 2001) (on file with author).
In two cases the litigation ceased either by agreement of the parties or court order. See
Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981) (remanding for thorough assessment of
competency to waive appeals). On remand the lower court found Hays incompetent and the
attorneys for Hays and the State agreed to not proceed with the case. See Editorial, THE
TULSA TRIBUNE, June 14, 1991, at A8 (noting that "in 1981 Hays plea to be executed was
placed on indefinite hold because of his delusionary state."). Hays died of natural causes in
1997. Discussion list correspondence (on file with author). In Council v. Catoe, the court
found petitioner incompetent, stayed the proceedings, appointed a guardian ad litem for
Council, ordered petitioner evaluated annually to determine if he had regained his
competency, and allowed the prosecution to take depositions to preserve witness testimony.
Council v. Catoe, No. 00-CP-02-187, slip op. at 1, 3, 18-20 (Aiken Cty. Ct. of Common
Pleas July 31, 2001).
195. See infra Section 11.
196. Justice Brennan's personal Conference List at 4 (Apr. 7, 1967) (Library of
Congress WJB B 147 F4). Brennan noted "Discuss" next to Rees v. Peyton on the official
Conference List. Conference for April 7, 1967 (List 3, Sheet 1) (Library of Congress WJB
B147 F3).
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stated only "held without action on the petition for certiorari until further
order of the Court.'
' 97
The order does not state the basis on which the Court decided to hold
the case.' 98 Archival documents reveal that the federal district court found
Rees incompetent to decide to abandon or continue with the litigation.
Certainly this informed the Court's decision to stay the proceedings. And,
while speculation about the reasons for Court actions may be risky, at times
it is useful to consider not only the actual historical record, but also the
broader historical context in which the events occurred.
3. The Legal Milieu in Which the Court Decided to Stay Rees
By April 1967, when the Court was deciding how to proceed in Rees,
it was not certain that society or the courts would continue to support the
death penalty. The size of death row had steadily grown during the prior
five years-from 273 in 1962 to 415 in 1967,9 but the execution rate had
dropped precipitously--47 in 1962, 21 in 1963, 15 in 1964, 7 in 1965, 1 in
1966.200 When the Court voted to hold Rees in early April 1967, no
executions had occurred that year. The first execution of 1967 took place
five days after the Justices held Rees.20 ' Two months later, on June 2, 1967,
197. Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
198. This puzzled lower courts for years. See Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050,
1057, 1056-57 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that no Supreme Court opinion applies Rees and
no further orders had been entered since 1967 although the case was still pending);
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 403 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(commenting that since the Court had not applied Rees, "lower federal courts should be
reticent to apply elusive standards of competency that have been enunciated in cases whose
ultimate resolution remains similarly elusive.").
199. U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1962, 14 tbl. 5
(1963) (listing 273 prisoners under sentence of death as of Jan. 1, 1962); U.S. Dep't of
Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1930-1967, 14 tbl. 6 (1968) (listing 415
prisoners under sentence of death as of Jan. 1, 1967).
200. National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1962, supra note 199, at 14 tbl. 5 (47
executions in 1962); U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1930-
1963, 14 tbl. 5 (1964) (21 executions in 1963); U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Prisoner
Statistics: Executions 1930-1964, 14 tbl. 4 (1965) (15 executions in 1964); U.S. Dep't of
Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1930-1965, 14 tbl. 6 (1966) (7 executions
in 1965); U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Executions 1930-1966, 13 tbl.
14 (1967) (1 execution in 1966). The one execution in 1966 was James French, in
Oklahoma, who sought to be executed. See also MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 146 (1973).
201. On April 12, 1967 California executed Aaron Mitchell. See MELTSNER, supra note
200, at 135-36.
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the last execution until 1977 took place.2"2 A confluence of factors
contributed to the decline and then cessation of executions: public support
for the death penalty was waning, and perhaps most importantly for the
Court, appeals of death sentences were on the rise throughout the country.2"3
These appeals, raising systemic challenges to the constitutionality of the
death penalty, were demanding the Court's attention.2 4
In the midst of this significant downturn in executions and the rising
questions about the constitutionality of the death penalty,205 the
Commonwealth of Virginia's filings with the Court implied the possibility
of seeking to execute Rees. In its Answer to Rhyne's Motion for Stay, the
Commonwealth had argued that the failure to dispose of the case prevented
the people of Virginia from securing a final adjudication of the case-in
other words, executing Rees.20 6 The Commonwealth reiterated this stance
in its final Memorandum to the Court urging the Court to act on the petition
so that it would bring finality to the state court judgment. Once the litigation
in the Supreme Court was over, the stay imposed by the trial court judge
would be lifted, and the Commonwealth could proceed to seek an execution
date. Of course, the issue of Rees's incompetence would continue, but in a
different context and a different judicial forum. The Commonwealth had
conceded Rees's incompetence in light of the district court's report, but it
202. Colorado executed Luis Jose Monge on June 2, 1967. See id. at 113. Monge asked
to be executed. Id. Gary Gilmore was the first person executed in 1977 after the U.S.
Supreme Court found new death penalty statutes constitutional. DEATH Row USA, supra
note 23, at 11. Two of the last three individuals executed prior to the moratorium waived
their appeals. See MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 113, 146 (Monge and James French). Four
of the first five, after the moratorium ended, waived their appeals and sought to be executed.
See DEATH Row USA, supra note 23, at 10 (referencing Gary Gilmore, Jan. 17, 1977, Jesse
Bishop, Oct. 22, 1979, Steven Judy, Mar. 9, 1981, Frank Coppola, Aug. 10, 1982. John
Spenkelink, executed May 25, 1979, did not waive his appeals).
203. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY-AN AMERICAN HISTORY 244-247
(2003) (describing the indicia of changes in public support and reasons for the increase in
appeals).
204. Id. at 247-57 (explaining the development of a national legal strategy to raise
systemic challenges and the Court's response). As Banner notes, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund played a key role in "getting the arguments against the constitutionality of the death
penalty before the Supreme court in a context in which they would be taken seriously." Id.
at 253; see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 431-36
(2000) (discussing the role of the NAACP LDF in stopping executions and bringing the
issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty to the forefront); see also MELTSNER, supra
note 200, at 106-25 (explaining the NAACP LDF's strategy to create a moratorium on
executions).
205. Virginia's last execution had been in 1962. National Prisoner Statistics:
Executions 1962, supra note 199, at 14 tbl. 5.
206. Respondent's Answer, supra note 94, at 4.
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also raised the expectation that Rees would regain his competence if the
case were reversed and retrial became necessary.0 7 Short of that, Rees's
attorney could litigate the issue of Rees's competence in state proceedings
on the ground that he was incompetent to be executed. That litigation would
occur in the state courts of Virginia, on the Attorney General's home turf.
The Commonwealth agreed that it would not execute an insane person, and
that as long as Rees was detained in the state mental hospital, it would not
seek an execution date. But it is unclear what was to keep Rees in the state
hospital.20 8 If Rees returned to the state penitentiary, the Commonwealth
would not be bound by its promise. Yet, the record in this case documented
a seriously mentally ill man. It may have seemed too perilous to the Justices
to send Rees back into the throes of the Virginia courts,20 9 especially when
the Commonwealth's representative before the Court spoke of the
possibility of execution.
III. RECONSIDERATION IN THE 1970s
The Court took no further action in Rees until April 2, 1971. At that
time E. Robert Seaver, the new Clerk of the Court, raised with Chief Justice
Warren Earl Burger the possibility of removing both Rees v. Peyton and
Anderson v. Kentucky from the Court's docket.210 Seaver was concerned
that the Court could be perceived as supervising Rees's mental state, when
that should be a state responsibility, as Rees was in the Commonwealth's
custody.21 To that end, Seaver drafted a proposed order for the Court that
denied the petition subject to the condition that the case be remanded to the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which would stay judgment until, after
appropriate hearings, it was determined that Rees was competent to present
his petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. 12 According
to Seaver's memo, at the April 2, 1971 Conference, the Court "decided not
207. Respondent's Memorandum, supra note 172, at 3.
208. Other than the fact that all of the doctors who evaluated Rees concluded that he
was mentally ill, no reason existed for him to stay in the state hospital. Arguably, the
Commonwealth could rely on the clarification by two of the doctors that "Rees was not
psychotic," see supra note 158, to obtain his transfer back to the state penitentiary.
209. If the Justices had this concern, it may have been augmented by the fact that the
only execution in 1966 was a man who waived his appeals, and similarly, one of the only
two forthcoming executions in 1967 was a man who waived his appeals. See MELTSNER,
supra note 200, at 113, 146.
210. Memorandum to the Files from E. Robert Seaver, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court at
1 (Apr. 16, 1971) (U.S. National Archives).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2.
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to take any action with respect to this case at this time." '213
Again, it is worthwhile to consider why the Court chose this course of
action. First, the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari itself would
instigate the need for Rhyne to consider filing a petition for rehearing-on
the substantive issues as well as the terms of the remand-and that would
require consulting with Rees, who was still incompetent as far as anyone
knew. Second, as a strictly procedural matter, the Clerk's proposed
disposition could have been seen as a complicated and unworkable step.
The Clerk suggested remanding the case to a Virginia state court, but the
case was not an appeal from a state court judgment, it was an appeal from
a judgment of the federal court of appeals on Rees's federal petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. It would be highly unusual, if not impossible, to
remand a federal habeas appeal to a state court. If, as the Clerk proposed,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals eventually determined Rees was
competent to present his certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
petition would seek review of a federal court decision (on the
constitutionality of his conviction and sentence) as well as, possibly, the
state court decision (on his competency).
In the broader context of the Court's consideration of death penalty
cases generally, the suggestion to remand Rees to a state court came at a
particularly intense, precarious, and tumultuous time. 214 From 1968 to 1972,
the Court heard and decided several important death penalty cases.1 5
213. The memo notes that the Chief Justice thought that the case could go on the newly
designated list of suspended cases, separate from the active cases. Id. at 1. Apparently this
is the point at which Anderson was given the case number S-I, and Rees, S-2.
214. See, e.g., BoB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 205 (1979)
(reporting that during the 1971 Term, Justice Marshall found that "the Court's curious
handling of death [penalty] cases in the last several years.. . reflected a deep ambivalence
among his colleagues"). During this time, the composition of the Court underwent rapid,
unexpected, and numerous changes - from 1969 to 1972 four of the nine justices changed.
Id. at 9-26, 86-91, 156-63 (recounting how Warren and Fortas were replaced by Burger and
Blackmun, and Black and Harlan were replaced by Powell and Rehnquist). Woodward and
Armstrong discuss how the change in Justices, among other factors, affected the outcome
in one death penalty case, Maxwell v. Bishop. Id. at 205-06. The Court granted certiorari in
the case in 1968 on two issues: (1) the constitutionality of absolute jury discretion in
deciding whether to sentence a person to life or death, and (2) single verdicts in which the
jury decided guilt and punishment at the same time. Maxwell v. Bishop, 393 U.S. 997
(1968). The first vote of the Justices in 1968 was 6-2 to find the single verdict
unconstitutional. Due to ensuing problems with drafting and changes in the Court's
composition, the decision was not finalized. By 1970, the Court reversed and remanded
Maxwell on a completely different issue. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (finding
the jury selection process unconstitutional). While Maxwell was pending, the Court held all
death penalty cases in abeyance. MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 148.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (finding unconstitutional
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Although the Court first agreed to hear a direct Eighth Amendment
challenge to the death penalty in 1969,16 it did not hold that the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it
was cruel and unusual punishment until 1972.217
In early April 1971, when the Clerk inquired about Rees, the Court was
one month away from issuing its opinion in the consolidated cases of
McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio.2 8 These cases addressed
two key constitutional issues in death penalty trials: (1) the validity of
unitary proceedings in which the jury decided guilt and punishment at the
same time, and (2) the absence of standards to guide the jury's sentencing
decision. 19 While the cases did not present Eighth Amendment challenges
to the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court's decisions would
affect the fate of individuals across the country who had been sentenced to
death. Indeed, some feared that if the Court upheld the death penalty
the federal kidnapping statute because it encouraged the defendant to plead guilty to avoid
the death penalty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding death sentences,
but not convictions, unconstitutional when potential jurors were excused for cause because
they opposed or had religious or conscientious scruples against the death penalty). See also
MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 115-25 (discussing the significance of both cases for the
ongoing moratorium); POWE, supra note 204, at 432-35 (discussing the impact of Jackson
and Witherspoon, observing "Witherspoon was a bombshell because everyone assumed that
without a death-qualified jury the death penalty was an impossibility").
216. In Boykin v. Alabama, the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari on two
issues: (1) whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) whether
Boykin's guilty plea was invalid because the judge failed to inquire on the record whether
Boykin understood his plea. MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 169-70. The Court decided the
case on the second issue. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). As Meltsner
observed, although the Court did not decide the case on the Eighth Amendment issue, the
"seed had been planted." MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 184.
217. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also infra notes 230-31 and
accompanying text.
218. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
219. In a unitary proceeding the jury heard all evidence related to guilt and punishment
at the same time and returned one verdict on both issues (for example, guilty without capital
punishment). It was argued that this was unconstitutional because it created a tension
between the defendant's right to remain silent as to guilt and his right to be heard on
punishment. If a defendant testified with respect to punishment, his testimony might include
facts about the crime. Thus, he would be forced to become a witness against himself as to
guilt. Id. at 210-11, 213. (Today, death penalty trials are bifurcated. First, the jury hears
evidence as to guilt. Then, if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a murder for which the
death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury hears additional evidence from both sides,
in a separate proceeding, that may be unrelated to guilt but is directly related to determining
the appropriate punishment, such as information about the defendant's character or
background.) The unitary trial exacerbated the second constitutional issue - unguided jury
decisionmaking. Here, the argument was that without guidance, the jury's decision could be
based on arbitrary factors, including racial prejudice. Id. at 195.
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statutes at issue in McGautha and Crampton, the unofficial moratorium on
executions in effect since 1967 would end.22°
On May 3, 1971 the Court announced its decision, holding 6-3 that
neither unitary proceedings nor unguided jury decisionmaking violated the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.22' That same day, Governors in
Ohio and Maryland announced that no execution would occur in their states
until the Court resolved whether the death penalty itself was
constitutional.22 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund immediately filed
supplemental briefs in pending cases urging the Court to decide the
223 Tetmfundamental Eighth Amendment issue. The time was ripe for the Court
220. See, e.g., MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 240 (describing a column by Anthony
Lewis, concluding that the United States "faced the brutalizing effect of a mass slaughter if
McGautha and Crampton lost their cases"); Suspension orAbolishment of the Death Penalty,
Hearings on H.R. 8141 et al., Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 221 (1972) (Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in
America-Review and Forecast, in Appendix) (reprinted from Federal Probation 1971)
(remarking that media reports suggest that, post-McGautha, executions are significantly
more likely in some states but not in others). The fear, apparently, was not unfounded. In
THE BRETHREN, Woodward and Armstrong report that after the Court announced the
decision in McGautha, the justices met to decide who "could now be executed." See
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 214, at 206. According to Woodward and
Armstrong, Justice Stewart "balk[ed]," maintaining that the fundamental issue of "whether
the death penalty was cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment still had
to be decided. Id.
221. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183. The Court held that unitary proceedings did not
violate due process because the defendant is not required to testify as to either guilt or
punishment. Id. at 213-20. Therefore, he must bear the risk involved in waiving one right
(to remain silent as to guilt) in order to assert another (the right to be heard as to
punishment). Id. at 210-17. Unguided jury decisionmaking did not violate due process
because:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge,
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion
of the jury the power to pronounce life or death is capital cases is offensive to
anything in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume that jurors
confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow
human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will
consider a variety of factors. For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate
factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of
consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete.
Id. at 207-08 (footnote omitted).
222. MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 245. In California, Governor Reagan announced
a "wait and see policy." Id. As Meltsner observed, "no one was eager to be the first to press
the button." Id.
223. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 448-49 (1994) (noting that the
brief told the Court about 120 capital cases pending before it on a plethora of death penalty
issues and that "the Court could not allow people to be executed without resolving these
issues"); MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 245 (noting that LDF made a "back-to-the-wall plea
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to decide this question.
On June 28, 1971, two months after issuing its decision in McGautha,
the Court announced that it would hear the appeals in four cases, all of
which involved the question of whether the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.224 A June 8,
1971 Memorandum to the Conference from Justices Brennan and White
showed that the Court carefully considered how to proceed in the many
pending death penalty cases.225 It appeared that in deciding which cases to
hear, the Court reviewed the full range of cases in which the death penalty
had been imposed226 and selected cases based on how cleanly the issues
were presented and decided by the lower courts,227 as well as the quality of
counsel who would represent both the petitioners and the states.2 28
In light of this sustained activity in the Court regarding bedrock issues
about the constitutionality of the death penalty, it is significant that the
Court did not take any action in Rees in 1971. Rees's presumed continued
incompetence certainly held the Court to its initial position of not being able
to decide whether to grant or deny certiorari. That may have been enough
for the Court to decline to act. Yet it also may have been reluctant to
consider whether some other course of action-such as remanding it to a
state court-would be appropriate given the Court's state of flux regarding
to decide the cruel and unusual punishment issue").
224. Aikens v. California, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Branch v. Texas, cert.
granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971); Furman v. Georgia, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971);
Jackson v. Georgia, cert. granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971). The Court eventually dismissed
Aikens after the California Supreme Court held the California death penalty statute
unconstitutional. Aikens v. California, dismissed as moot, 406 U.S. 813 (1972); see People
v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (holding the California death penalty statute
unconstitutional under California's cruel or unusual punishment clause).
225. Memorandum to the Conference from Justices William J. Brennan and Byron
White (June 8, 1971) (Library of Congress TM B64 F5). The initials WJB, Jr. and BW are
typed at the end of the memo. The memo concludes, "[i]f we decide to grant these cases, it
will be necessary to hold at least 148 cases for their decision." Id. at 4.
226. For example, the Court looked at cases where the crime was rape or robbery as
well as homicide. Id. at 1-3.
227. Noting that in Branch and Jackson "[t]he Eighth Amendment issue was squarely
presented and decided by the state courts," whereas Miller v. Georgia "is a bad case because
it also raises the issue of the retroactivity." Id. at 2-3.
228. Observing that, as to the rape cases, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund represented
the petitioner in Jackson, so he would have satisfactory counsel, but "[o]n the other hand,
we'd probably get better representation from Texas in Branch than we would from Georgia
in Jackson." Id. at 3. As to the homicide cases, "[o]ur preference is clearly for the latter
[Aiken as opposed to Furman] since California is always well represented and the petitioner
is represented by both [Tony] Amsterdam and Bill Douglas' former clerk, Jerome Falk." Id
at 4.
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the death penalty. It is also possible that some of the Justices remembered
the State's repeated references to the possibility of executing Rees and may
have preferred to have the case sit quietly until the direction of the Court
was resolved.229
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court held, in a 5-4 per curiam
opinion that "the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. 23" Each Justice wrote separately; the opinions cover over two
hundred pages of the official U.S. Reporter.23' The result was that the death
sentences of all persons on death row across the country were vacated.232 In
Virginia, the twelve men on death row were resentenced to life terms. 233
Curiously, Rees was not included as one of those on Virginia's death row.
By 1972, Rees was back at the federal Springfield Medical Center where he
had been sent for psychiatric treatment. 34 The Commonwealth of Virginia,
229. As had occurred prior to the decision in McGautha, many persons were concerned
that if the Court upheld the death penalty in Furman, a wave of executions would occur. See,
e.g., Suspension or Abolishment of the Death Penalty, House Hearings, supra note 220, at
I (Statement of Hon. Emanuel Celler) (commenting that a moratorium is necessary because
"concerned citizens everywhere" do not want executions to resume while the courts and
state and federal legislatures "are engaged in a profound reexamination of the efficacy of the
death penalty"); Id. at 58 (Testimony of Prof. Anthony G. Amsterdam) (stating that "the
effect [of finding the death penalty constitutional] may be to subject to imminent execution
a staggering, positively staggering, number of condemned men"); Id. at 435 (citing Prof.
Charles L. Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, in Appendix (reprinted from 31
MARYLAND L. REv. 289 (1972)) (noting that "we are in crisis" because if the judicial stay
ends, "many may be executed in the next year").
230. 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972) (per curiam) (cases consolidated).
231. Three of the five justices in the majority (Douglas, Stewart, and White) found the
then existing statutory death penalty schemes arbitrary and capricious, albeit for different
reasons. Id. Douglas focused on racial disparities. Id. at 240-57. Stewart concentrated on the
random application of the death penalty. Id. at 306-10. White was concerned with the
infrequent imposition of death sentences. Id. at 310-14. Justices Marshall and Brennan
found the death penalty unconstitutional in all respects, not just as presently constituted. Id.
at 314-75, 257-306. As Chief Justice Burger observed in dissent, new death penalty statutes
that addressed the plurality's concerns might be found constitutional. Id. at 375-403. Indeed,
four years later that is exactly what occurred when the Court held constitutional newly
adopted death penalty statutes. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
232. See MELTSNER, supra note 200, at 293 (noting that 631 persons were on death row
across the country).
233. See Frank Green, 12 Virginians on Death Row were Saved, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 29, 1997, at Al.
234. Progress and Psychological Report from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, MCFP-
Springfield 2 (May 18, 1987) (noting that in June 1968 Rees "was returned" to the
Springfield facility "for psychiatric treatment") (U.S. National Archives). The Virginia
Attorney General's office forwarded this report to the Court. See Letter from Jerry P.
Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, to Frank Lorson, Chief Deputy Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (June 3, 1987) (U.S. National Archives).
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apparently, forgot about him.
235
Once the Court decided Furman, the uncertainty over the status of the
death penalty could no longer explain the Court's inaction in Rees.
Paradoxically, Rees did not receive the benefit of the Court's resolution of
that issue. Rees was not held pending the decision in Furman, so the Court
did not act to vacate his sentence. Technically the case was pending in the
federal court system, so a state court would not have acted on his death
sentence. Thus, Rees remained under sentence of death; a sentence he had
once sought to have carried out, but which no longer would or could be.
IV. RESOLUTION IN THE 1980S AND 1990s
In 1988 Governor Baliles finally commuted Rees's death sentence to
life imprisonment.236 Baliles's motivation was to treat Rees "consistently
with other similarly situated death row inmates whose sentences were
commuted by former Governor Godwin. '237 The commutation prompted the
Court to reconsider the case one more time.238 At the direction of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Francis J. Lorson, Chief Deputy Clerk, wrote a
memorandum to the Conference proposing that the Court review the case.239
Lorson attached a memo from one of the Justice's clerks that evaluated the
merits of the questions presented in the original 1965 petition for writ of
certiorari. 240 Lorson suggested, however, that before any consideration of
the merits of the petition, the Court seek supplemental briefing on four
issues: (1) the district court's 1966 findings and conclusions in response to
235. See McKelway, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that "Virginia officials apparently had
forgotten about him because he was in the federal prison system").
236. See Letter from Jerry P. Slonakar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, to Frank
Lorson, Chief Deputy Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 6, 1988) (U.S. National Archives).
237. Letter from Sandra D. Bowen, Secretary of the Commonwealth, to Melvin Davis
Rees, Jr. (Jan. 4, 1988) (U.S. National Archives). Rees may have prompted this action. Rees
reported to the psychologist, in 1987, that he had written several letters to the
Commonwealth asking that his death sentence be vacated, as occurred with other Virginia
death row inmates. Federal Bureau of Prisons, supra note 234, at 2. His letters grew out of
a news reporter talking to him about his case. Id.
Henry Anderson's death sentence was never commuted. Wolfson, supra note 72, at
8A. Indeed, the Kentucky Attorney General's office still believed in 1987 that his death
sentence was valid. Id.
238. The Virginia Attorney General's office notified the Court of the commutation. See
Letter from Slonakar, supra note 236.
239. Memorandum from Francis J. Lorson, Chief Deputy Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court
to the Conference (N.D., the memo states that papers in the case were distributed to the
Court for the April 1, 1988 Conference) (U.S. National Archives).
240. Preliminary Memorandum from Rob Werner (Mar. 21, 1988) (U.S. National
Archives).
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the Supreme Court's initial remand; (2) the developments in the law since
1965 when the petition was filed; (3) the effect of the commutation on the
petition; and (4) any other relevant matters. 2 1 The Court took neither of
these steps. It is not even clear that the Court discussed the case at its Friday
Conference. Justice Marshall's notation on the Conference List for April 1,
1988 shows a line drawn through the case number and name.242 It may be
that the Court agreed with the conclusion reached by the law clerk who
wrote: "I can think of no procedure the Court might establish for monitoring
the case that might not establish an unwarranted precedent.
243
A final consideration of the broader context of death penalty cases may
help explain the Court's reluctance to take any action in Rees's case. By
1988 the legal climate surrounding death penalty cases was vastly different
that in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1976 the Court had found that new
death penalty statutes adopted by states in Furman's wake were
constitutional. 244 By the end of 1987, 1,984 people were on death row
across the country 245 and executions were on the rise. 24 6
241. Memorandum from Lorson, supra note 239, at 2.
242. Conference List for Friday April 1, 1988 (List 1, Sheet 1) (Library of Congress
TM B434 F10).
243. The law clerk recommended first ascertaining if Rees was still incompetent. If he
was, the law clerk recommended retaining the case on the special docket. Preliminary
Memorandum from Werner, supra note 240, at 13.
244. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), andJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court upheld the new statutes adopted
in, respectively, Georgia, Florida, and Texas. According to the plurality opinions of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, these statutes were constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment because they addressed the Justices concerns in Furman: they narrowed the
class of crimes for which a defendant could be sentenced to death; they guided the jury's
punishment decision, and they provided for individualized consideration of whether the
death penalty was the appropriate punishment for the particular defendant. Each of these
new death penalty schemes utilized a bifurcated trial process rather than a unitary one. The
Court also held that new statutes adopted in North Carolina and Louisiana were
unconstitutional because they imposed mandatory death sentences for certain crimes. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976). The Court held that these statutes violated the Eighth Amendment
proscription against arbitrary and capricious sentences because they did not permit
individualized sentencing.
245. See Size of Death Row by Year, Death Penalty Information Center, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (accessed from home page by selecting The Facts, Death
Row) (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
246. The first execution was in January 1977. See DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 23,
at 11. Thereafter, between 1977 and 1983, ten persons were executed. Id. The numbers of
executions then began to rise: twenty-one in 1984, eighteen in each of 1985 and 1986,
twenty-five in 1987. Id. at 10-11. By April 1988, three more individuals had been executed.
Id. at 12.
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Of the ninety-six persons who had been executed from 1976 to April
1988, thirteen were individuals who had waived their appeals and sought
to be executed.247 Unlike Rees, none of the individuals sought to waive his
appeal for the first time while his case was pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court. Indeed, six of the thirteen individuals did not seek review
of their case in the Court.248 The cases that came to the Court did so through
a person acting as next friend seeking a stay of execution.249
The Court's response to the next friend petitions was quite different
than it had been to Rhyne's Motion for Stay in Rees. While it is true that in
these cases some assessment of the inmate's competence to waive his
appeals had been made in the lower courts, usually that assessment failed
to come close to the careful examination that occurred in the federal district
court in Rees.2 5 0 Nonetheless, in the three instances where the Court, or the
247. See id. (listing Gary Gilmore (Utah, Jan. 17, 1977), Jesse Bishop (Nevada, October
22, 1979), Steven Judy (Indiana Mar. 9, 1981), Frank Coppola (Virginia, Aug. 10, 1982),
John Evans (Alabama, April 22, 1983) (later changing his mind, see infra note 252), Stephen
P. Morin (Texas, Mar. 13, 1985), Charles Rumbaugh (Texas, Sept. 11, 1985), William
Vandiver (Indiana, Oct. 16, 1985), Carroll Cole (Nevada, Dec. 6, 1985), Jeffery Barney
(Texas, Apr. 16, 1986), Ramon Hernandez (Texas, Jan. 30, 1987), Eliseo Moreno (Texas,
Mar. 4,1987), Robert Streetman (Texas, Jan. 7, 1988)); see also Amnesty International, The
Illusion of Control: "Consensual" Executions, The Impending Death of Timothy McVeigh,
and the Brutalizing Futility of Capital Punishment (2001), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org (accessed from homepage by entering "illusion of control" into
search space) (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (providing brief descriptions of each of the men
and his case). Neither LDF nor Amnesty lists Robert Streetman. I include him among the
twelve because one day before his execution the Fifth Circuit opinion affirmed the lower
court finding that Streetman was competent to waive his appeals. See Streetman v. Lynaugh,
835 F.2d 1521 (5th Cir. 1988).
248. Stephen P. Morin, William Vandiver, Carroll Cole, Jeffery Barney, Eliseo
Moreno, Robert Streetman.
249. Gary Mark Gilmore by his mother, Bessie Gilmore as next friend. See Gilmore v.
Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (terminating the stay of execution). John Lewis Evans, III by
his mother, Betty Evans as next friend. See Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, granting a temporary stay of execution). Jesse Walter Bishop by
Clark County Deputy Public Defenders Kirk B. Lenhard and George E. Franzen as his next
friends. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, granting
a temporary stay of execution). Steven T. Judy, by Larry Williams as his next friend. See
Williams v. Indiana, 450 U.S. 971 (1981) (denying stay application). Frank Coppola by his
attorney J. Gray Lawrence as his next friend. See Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1123
(1982) (vacating stay of execution). Charles Rumbaugh by his parents, Harvey and Rebecca
Rumbaugh as his next friends. See Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919 (1985) (Marshall
and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Ramon Pedro Hernandez, by his
attorney Richard Lovelace as his next friend. See Lovelace v. Lynaugh, 479 U.S. 1071
(1987) (denying stay application).
250. In Gilmore, the evidence of competency to waive his appeals consisted of the pre-
trial determination that he was competent to stand trial, and two reports, one from a prison
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designated Circuit Court Justice, explained its action, it found no error in
the lower court's determination of competency.25' In each of those three
psychiatrist based on a one hour post-trial psychological evaluation, and one from two prison
psychologists, and a supplemental report after Gilmore attempted suicide in which the prison
psychiatrist reported no change in his mental state. See Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1015 n.5
(Burger, C.J. concurring). Justice Marshall dissented from the termination of the stay of
execution on several grounds, including that no adversary hearing on Gilmore's competency
had occurred, the lower court transcript presented to the Court was missing that portion
where Gilmore's trial attorney talked about whether he thought Gilmore was competent, and
the entire time frame-five months from the crime and two from sentencing-was too quick
to allow for Gilmore's "mature consideration" of his waiver. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
In Evans, it does not appear that any hearing took place regarding Evans's competence
to waive his appeals. Justice Rehnquist quoted from the federal district opinion that referred
to evidence the court considered. Evans, 440 U.S. at 1304-05. The district court concluded
that Betty Evans had not shown any change from the pretrial finding that her son, John
Evans was competent to stand trial despite the fact that Evans presented an affidavit from
a psychiatrist who concluded Evans was not rational. Id. at 1304. The affidavit was based
on conversations with persons who knew him because Evans refused to see the psychiatrist.
Id.
In Jesse Bishop's case, Justice Rehnquist noted that, beyond the pretrial evidentiary
hearing at which Bishop was found competent to plead guilty and represent himself, "[t]here
has been no subsequentjudicial determination of his competence to waive further litigation."
Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1311. The only additional information the courts had was a report from
the only psychiatrist Bishop agreed to see, who concluded that Bishop was competent, and
the judge's personal observations of Bishop in court. Id. Justice Marshall's dissent disputed
the competency finding noting that Bishop presented no mitigating evidence in support of
a life sentence at trial, he was a drug addict still heavily medicated on tranquilizers, he said
he would rather die than live under the inhumane prison conditions, and he was hopeless
about his case and thought it undignified to ask for mercy. Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807,
812 n.2 (1979) (Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of stay).
The judicial determination that Frank Coppola was competent was made at a
nonadversarial hearing. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
Rumbaugh is the one case in which the federal district court appeared to conduct a
thorough assessment of competency. It ordered Rumbaugh evaluated at a federal facility for
thirty days, and at an evidentiary hearing heard testimony from psychiatrists and
psychologists presented by both the State and Rumbaugh's parents. See Rumbaugh v.
Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1985). Justice Marshall observed, however, that the
lower courts failed to properly apply the Rees standard. Rumbaugh, 473 U.S. at 920
(Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.) ("This Court should not allow the erosion
of the standard set in Rees, and it should certainly prevent such erosion in the context of
capital punishment.").
251. See Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1014 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I am in complete
agreement with the conclusion expressed in the [Utah Supreme] court's order that Gary
Mark Gilmore knowingly and intelligently, with full knowledge of his right to seek an
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, has waived that right"); Id. at 1017 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (finding that the record "supports the conclusion that Gilmore was competent
to waive his right to appeal"); Evans, 440 U.S. at 1303-06 (Rehnquist, Cir. J.) (reviewing
with approval the lower court's assessment of competency); Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1310-13
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cases the Court, or Justice, initially granted a stay application to allow the
State to respond, and then terminated the stay with alacrity.252 In other cases
the Court denied the stay application or certiorari petition without written
opinion."
The Court's treatment of Virginia death row inmate Frank Coppola's
case is especially striking in comparison to how the Court handled Rees's
case. In April 1982 Coppola discharged his attorney, sought to withdraw his
petition for writ of habeas corpus pending in federal court, and asked that
the Commonwealth set an execution date for him.2 54 In response, in May
1982, the state court judge appointed a new attorney for Coppola "[flor the
(Rehnquist, Cir. J.) (same).
252. In Gilmore, the Court (6-3) granted a stay of execution on Dec. 3, 1976 to allow
the State to respond to the application for stay and to file the transcript of the state court
proceedings. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). On Dec. 13, 1976 the Court (5-4)
terminated the stay finding that Gilmore was represented by counsel and that the state court
transcript showed that Gilmore knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal. Id.
at 1012. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented on the ground that Gilmore should
not be able to waive the state court's determination of the constitutionality of its death
penalty statute. Id. at 1018 (White, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Marshall
separately dissented on the ground that the state court determination of Gilmore's
competency was wholly inadequate. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
dissented on the ground that the Court gave too little consideration to the important
questions regarding Bessie Gilmore's standing as next friend and the constitutionality of the
Utah death penalty statute. Id. at 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Three years later, in Evans, Justice Rehnquist, as the designated Circuit Court Justice,
granted an application for stay of execution so that the state could respond and the full Court
could consider the matter at its Friday conference seven days hence. Evans v. Bishop, 440
U.S. 1301 (1979) (noting that, were the matter up to him, he would deny the application, but
out of deference to the concerns of other Justices, he granted it). The full Court then vacated
the stay, in part because, in the intervening days, Evans changed his mind and decided to
continue litigating his case and no new execution date had been set. See Evans v. Bishop,
440 U.S. 987 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring). In Jesse Bishop's case, Justice Rehnquist, on
Aug. 25, 1979, granted a stay of execution so that the State could respond and the full Court
consider the matter. Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1306. On Oct. 1, 1979 the Court denied the stay
application, 7-2. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807 (1979) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that "the procedure the Court approved
today amounts to nothing less than state-administered suicide." Id. at 815 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
253. See Williams (next friend for Steven Judy) v. Indiana, 450 U.S. 971 (1981)
(denying stay application) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., would grant); Rumbaugh (next friend
for Charles Rumbaugh) v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919 (1985) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lovelace (next friend for Ramon Hernandez) v.
Lynaugh, 479 U.S. 1071 (1987) (denying stay application) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of stay).
254. Statement of Fact and Proceedings at 3, Commonwealth v. Coppola (Newport
News Cir. Ct., Va. June 25, 1982) (No. 4072-78) (reconstructed on Aug. 3, 1982) (U.S.
National Archives).
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purposes of setting an execution date .... In June, the state court judge
held a non-adversarial hearing at which the new counsel reported to the
judge that he had met with Coppola, that Coppola reiterated his decision to
drop his appeals and seek execution, and that he (new counsel) believed
Coppola understood his choices and the consequences of his decision.256
Based on the attorney's representations, and a report prepared by two state
psychiatrists at the request of the court, the judge found Coppola competent
to forego his appeals. 257 Coppola was not present at this hearing and neither
was anyone who might challenge whether Coppola was competent. 258 The
only participants were the judge, the new attorney representing Coppola,
and the Commonwealth's attorney.259 The judge set an execution date of
August 10, 1982.26 °
Thereafter, one of Coppola's original attorneys, J. Gray Lawrence,
sought to stay Coppola's execution and filed a petition in the federal district
court to appear as Coppola's next friend on the ground that he was not
competent to waive his appeals.2 6' At a hearing the day before the scheduled
execution, a federal district court judge found that the state court hearing
was adequate and that Coppola was competent.262 She, therefore, denied
Lawrence's petition to appear as next friend and denied the application for
stay of execution.263 On August 10, Lawrence renewed his motion for stay
of execution in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 264 After reviewing the
papers presented by both Lawrence and the Commonwealth, Judge Butzner
issued a stay of execution at 2:40 p.m.
265
255. Id.
256. Id. at 3-5.
257. Id. at 7-8. None of the participants ever referred to the Rees standard. The
psychiatrists' conclusion appears to utilize a test that is vaguely related to Rees: "Mr.
Coppola failed to yield any evidence of the existence of a mental disorder which might have
acted to impair his capacity to appreciate the appellate procedures available to him or the
meaning and consequences of electing to withdraw from further appellate action." Id. at 7
(citing June 15, 1982 Report from William D. Lee, Forensic Clinical Psychologist and
Miller M. Ryan, Forensic Psychiatrist, to Judge Douglas M. Smith, Circuit Court Judge for
the City of Newport News (U.S. National Archives)).
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 7.
261. Transcript of Proceedings at 3, Gray (sic) v. Mitchell (E.D. Va. August 9, 1982)
(No. 82-0509-R).
262. Id. at 11-17.
263. Id. at 17-18.
264. Memorandum in Support of Application for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal,
Lawrence (individually and as next friend) v. Mitchell (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1982) (No. 82-
6495) (U.S. National Archives).
265. Order, Lawrence v. Mitchell (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1982) (No. 82-6495) (U.S.
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At 7:25 p.m. the Commonwealth filed a motion to vacate the stay in the
U.S. Supreme Court.266 The Court conferred via conference call at 9:10 p.m.
This was one hour before Lawrence, as Coppola's next friend, filed his
opposition to the motion to vacate at 10:22 p.m. 267 The Court entered the
order granting the State's motion at 10:30 p.m., eight minutes after
receiving the papers in opposition. 6 s At 11:05 p.m. Lawrence filed a
handwritten request to reconsider the order vacating the stay on the ground
that his papers had not yet been filed with the Court when the Court
conferred about the case.26 9 The Court never acted on this motion.27 °
Coppola was executed that night. 7'
Between the Court vacating the stay of execution in Coppola's case in
1982 and reconsidering Rees's case in 1988, eight men waived their appeals
and were executed.272 Of those eight, only two persons acting as next friend
sought review or a stay of execution from the Court. In 1985, Charles
Rumbaugh's parents filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of
the lower court proceedings in which Rumbaugh was found competent to
National Archives). Sometime later that day Judge Butzner denied the Commonwealth's
Motion to Vacate the Stay.
266. See Docket Sheet and Motion to Vacate Order Granting Stay of Execution marked
"application filed (7:25 p.m.)," Mitchell v. Lawrence (No. A- 147) (U.S. National Archives).
267. See Docket Sheet, supra note 266. The Court conferred by telephone because only
four of the Justices were in town. Justice O'Connor was out of the country and did not
participate. See Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982).
268. See Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1123. Justice Stevens wanted to call for petitioner's
response. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id; see also Docket Sheet, supra note
266 (noting time of decision and receipt of papers); Opposition to Motion to Vacate the
Order of the Hon. J.D. Butzner, Jr., Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Granting
a Stay of Execution, Lawrence v. Mitchell (No. A-147) (U.S. National Archives).
269. See Application for Stay Pending Consideration of Opposition to Motion to Vacate
by the full Court, Lawrence v. Mitchell (U.S. National Archives). At 11:35, the Court
received a telegram requesting that the Court stay the execution pending circulation and
reconsideration of Lawrence's papers in opposition to vacating the stay. Docket Sheet, supra
note 266.
270. To this day, the Court has not addressed what type of hearing is constitutionally
required in order to determine if a person is competent to waive their death penalty appeals.
See Hamilton (as next friend to James Smith) v. Texas, 498 U.S. 908 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in denial of cert.) (objecting to the process in case by which the Court granted
certiorari on the issue of what standards due process requires of a hearing to determine
whether a death row inmate is competent to waive appeals, but no fifth Justice stepped
forward to vote for a stay of execution, so James Smith was executed and the case was now
moot).
271. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The
Myth of Justice Delayed in Death Cases, in THE KILLING STATE 148 (Austin Sarat, ed.,
1999) (presenting a blistering analysis of how the Court's treatment of Coppola shows that
the Court had abandoned any sense of reason or decorum in ruling on death penalty cases).
272. See supra note 247.
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waive his appeals. The Court denied the petition in July, over a vigorous
dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan.273 The State of Texas executed
Rumbaugh in September 1985.274 In 1987, Richard Lovelace, as next friend
to Ramon Pedro Hernandez, filed an application for stay of execution on
January 30th, the day Hernandez was scheduled to be executed. That same
day the Court denied the application without written opinion and Hernandez
was executed.275
It was in this new context of how it was handling cases where the death
row inmate sought to waive his appeals, that the Court revisited Rees in
1988. The Court once again faced the dilemma of how, or whether, to act
in this case that had troubled it from the start. It appeared that Rees was still
incompetent to decide whether to abandon or continue the litigation of his
case.276 If the Court sought to ascertain Rees's current mental state, arguably
it would have had to request new psychological evaluations itself or again
remand the case for additional inquiry. Either approach might have created
the impression (or precedent) of greater involvement than the Court wanted
in a death penalty case where the inmate was seeking to waive his appeals.
Any action taken in Rees would have been inconsistent with the Court's
otherwise expeditious treatment of other death penalty cases where the
inmate's competency to waive his appeals was at issue.
Thus, while the Court's inaction in 1988 might appear to be a mere
continuation of the stay entered in 1967 and continued in 1971, the
273. Marshall argued that the lower courts failed to apply Rees correctly, "so that they,
in essence, allow[ed] a state capital punishment scheme to become an instrument for the
effectuation of suicide by a mentally ill man." Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 919
(1985) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ. dissenting from denial of cert.).
274. See DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 23, at 12.
275. Lovelace v. Lynaugh, 479 U.S. 1071 (1987) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting
from denial of stay). See Lovelace v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1987) (recounting
that the state court judge determined Hernandez was competent based on a telephone
conversation with him).
276. As the 1988 Preliminary Memorandum stated, "[Petitioner] remains confined to
a federal mental institution for the criminally insane. It would appear that [petitioner] is no
more capable of making a rational decision now than he was in 1967..." Preliminary
Memorandum from Werner, supra note 240, at 12. This conclusion was probably based on
the 1987 Progress Report that the Virginia Attorney General's office sent to the Court in
June 1987. Federal Bureau of Prisons, supra note 234. The staffpsychologist concluded that
Rees's schizophrenic condition was in remission and that his "condition has substantially
improved from the time of the 1965 Virginia State Court ruling that the defendant was
unable to make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation."
Id. at 3. He stated, Rees was "presently not actively psychotic." Id. However, the Progress
Report documented a long history of Rees being transferred from regular prisons back to the
medical center due to the reemergence of psychiatric problems. Thus, even if Rees had
"substantially improved" it did not mean he was competent.
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underlying policies and concerns in 1988 were quite different from those
previously motivating the Court. In 1967 and 1971, when the
constitutionality of the death penalty was in question and concerns for the
rights of the defendant were paramount, the Court apparently strove to
avoid any step that might expose Rees to the risk of execution. In 1988,
when the number of executions was rising and the Court was ruling
summarily in waiver cases, the Court seems to have declined to act in Rees
for the opposite reason-to avoid injecting heightened scrutiny of possible
incompetency into other death penalty cases where the defendant was
seeking to waive his appeals in order to be executed.
Ironically, while the Court's handling of Rees in 1988 had potential
consequences for other death penalty waiver cases, the consequences for
Rees himself had practically vanished. As of 1988, Rees was no longer
under sentence of death. He was serving three life sentences, still in a
federal medical center for the mentally ill. The stakes associated with
whether he could continue or abandon his litigation pending before the
Court no longer existed.277
The Court took its final action in Rees v. Peyton in 1995. On July 10,
1995 Rees died of a heart attack while still at the federal medical center in
Missouri.27 8 The Court dismissed the case on October 2, 1995.279
V. CONCLUSION
Rees v. Peyton is a small but noteworthy U.S. Supreme Court case. It
is the only time the Court has addressed the substantive standard that
federal courts must apply to determine whether a death row inmate is
competent to abandon or continue litigating his appeals. Yet, the Court
provided so little information about the case, substantively and
procedurally, that it has remained an enigma.
The archival documents elucidate the difficulties the Court had with
277. Heightening the irony, it appears that developments in Supreme Court
jurisprudence over the twenty years since Rees had filed his certiorari petition made it highly
unlikely that the Court would have agreed to hear his case. On both issues, prejudicial
pretrial publicity and illegal searches, subsequent Supreme Court decisions effectively
eviscerated the certworthy nature of the questions presented. See Preliminary Memorandum
from Werner, supra note 240, at 12-13 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(precluding federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims when the State
provided a full and fair opportunity for hearing); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984)
(finding no manifest error in trial judge determination that the jury was impartial; extensive
pretrial publicity had been before the first trial, not the second trial four years later)).
278. McKelway, supra note 5, at 1.
279. Rees v. Superintendent, 516 U.S. 802 (1995).
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Rees throughout its thirty-year pendency on the Court's docket. Despite
significant changes in the Court's composition and the leadership of three
Chief Justices, at every juncture the Court avoided taking any action that
might be construed as precedential. Initially the Court was hesitant to issue
an order transferring Rees to a state hospital for a psychological evaluation,
even though all of the doctors and lawyers agreed that this was a necessary
step. The Court instigated repeated attempts at an informal resolution, all
of which failed. Only then did the Court issue its one substantive decision,
remanding the matter to the federal district court for a determination of
whether Rees was competent to abandon or continue the litigation. After
remand, the Court's published order staying the proceedings did not contain
the basis for its decision, and thus provided no guidance for future cases.
Twenty years later, in 1988, one of the Court clerks cautioned against
taking a step that might establish an unwarranted precedent.
Perhaps, in some ways, the Court succeeded in keeping Rees a singular
case on its docket. But the historical context in which the Court made its
decisions suggests that more than issues unique to Rees informed the
Justices' actions. From 1965 to 1995 the legal landscape of the death
penalty underwent enormous change. In 1966 and 1967, when the Court
was first deciding how to proceed in Rees, the number of executions across
the country had dwindled to less than a handful. Yet, the Court was faced
with a man who sought execution. The doctors who evaluated him, and the
federal district court that held an evidentiary hearing on the matter, agreed
that he was mentally ill and not competent to decide to abandon or continue
the litigation of his case. In light of this, the Court took its most important
step in the case: it stayed the proceedings. While placing the case in a state
of indeterminacy, the Court's order was the appropriate response to the
determination that Rees was incompetent to decide to abandon or continue
the legal challenges to his conviction and death sentence. At the same time,
it protected him from being subject to execution.
When the Court reconsidered Rees in 1971, reason still existed to hold
the case. The Court was embroiled in a series of cases that challenged the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself. It made no sense to reactivate
Rees's case while the Court evaluated the very basis ofRees's sentence. By
1988, when the Court visited Rees's case for the final time, the
constitutionality of the death penalty had been resolved and executions were
on the rise. The Court itself seemed to be on firmer, and more hurried,
footing in ruling on death penalty cases where inmates sought to waive their
appeals. To reopen Rees's case would prompt a host of questions about how
the Court would determine his present competency. By this time, the Court
did not seem to want to be in the business of making that kind of
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assessment.
The history of Rees v. Peyton allows us to see some of the internal
operations of the Court as it struggled with a small, but important, case.
Whether Rees was competent to waive his appeals was, literally, a matter
of life or death for him. Once the federal district court concluded that Rees
was incompetent to abandon or continue the litigation of his death sentence,
the U.S. Supreme Court insulated Rees from being executed by staying the
proceedings in the case. Although Rees's risk of execution eventually
became moot, the Court's internal dilemmas about how to handle the case
persisted. Thus Rees's case stayed on the Court's docket until his natural
death.
EPILOGUE
The Court documents in Rees are historically significant because they
reveal, for the first time, how the Court resolved the difficult issues it faced
regarding how to determine whether Rees was competent to decide whether
to abandon or continue litigating his case, and whether to proceed once the
federal district court found Rees incompetent. A recent decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shows that these documents are of
present day import as well.
In June 2003, the Ninth Circuit held, in a death penalty case, that the
federal district court must stay post-conviction proceedings challenging the
constitutionality of the death row inmate's state conviction and death
sentence as long as the inmate is incompetent, i.e., "unable to communicate
rationally with counsel."28 The lower court, while finding Gates (the death
row inmate) incompetent, had refused to stay the proceedings, and instead
appointed a next friend to represent Gates's interests in the litigation. In
reversing the district court, Judge Kozinski, writing for the three-judge
panel, reasoned that a next friend cannot stand in the client's stead and
protect her interests because the next friend does not know what the client
knows, and in order for an attorney to meaningfully represent her client, she
needs access to information relevant to the case that only the client
possesses."' Thus, as long as Gates was incompetent, the proceedings must
be stayed because he was unable to communicate rationally with his
280. Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 807 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 234 S. Ct. 809 (2003).
281. Id. at 816. The court concluded that the federal statutory right to counsel in a
federal post-conviction proceeding includes a "statutory right to competence," id at 814,
because counsel must be able to communicate with her client in order to provide meaningful
assistance, id. at 812-14.
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
lawyer.2 82
In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit panel considered how other
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, had treated the issue of staying
proceedings in a death penalty case when the inmate is incompetent. Citing
Rees, the panel found that "[w]hat little Supreme Court authority exists on
this point also supports our conclusion., 21 3 The panel took judicial notice
of the unpublished and heretofore unknown record in Rees and found that
it explained the Court's summary order staying the proceedings in a way
that the panel found "persuasive. 2 4 In particular, it pointed to the
arguments that Rees's lawyer and the Commonwealth of Virginia made to
the Court as to how it should proceed once the district court had found Rees
incompetent. Rees's lawyer argued that the Court should grant certiorari
and stay the proceedings because Rees's incompetence made him unable to
make any decisions about the case. The Commonwealth argued that the case
should not be stayed under any circumstance. As the panel noted, "[t]he
Court's stay evidently constitutes a rejection of the State's position., 28 The
panel concluded that the Rees record "shows that incompetence is a grounds
for staying habeas proceedings. 2 6
The Rees court documents provide insight into a previously opaque
Supreme Court order staying proceedings in a death penalty case. This is
historically important. But, as Rohan demonstrates, the Rees documents
have contemporary value as well. For litigators and courts seeking guidance
in how to proceed in death penalty cases when the death row inmate may
be incompetent, the Rees documents establish a strong historical model for
thoroughly examining an inmate's mental capacity and staying court
proceedings when the inmate is deemed incompetent.
282. Id. at 819.
283. Id. at 815.
284. Id. at 815, n.7.
285. Id.; see supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text (describing the lawyers'
positions).
286. Rohan, 334 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
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